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ABSTRACT 
 
Through increasing globalization and trade liberalization, many third-world and developing 
countries are experiencing levels of growth that are quickly shifting the world’s balance of 
political and economic power.  China and India have dominated the global discussion of 
emerging economies, but other regions that have received much less attention hold attractive 
potential as well from the perspective of United States companies – in particular, Latin 
America. 
 
Domestic companies going international for the first time or even just into a type of foreign 
market that is very different from previous experience can find the learning curve steep and 
their once-reliable intuition no longer useful.  Penetrating such a market requires a taut 
supply chain and while there are many facets to any supply chain, we here focus on the 
transportation aspect and build the Latin American context surrounding it and affecting 
logistical decisions and paradigms.  By exploring the unsuccessful and ongoing attempts at 
regional integration, the policies that shape the business environment, the barriers and 
opportunities presented by a unique geography, and the underdeveloped infrastructure, we 
build the context necessary to develop a holistic understanding of Latin America and its 
diverse member nations.  Using this context, we explore a way to compare the new 
environment to old experiences and to provide knowledge required to plan supply chain 
networks in the region. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
‚The United States has a vital interest in that part of the country.‛ 
 
– referring to Latin America, 
commonly attributed to former 
United States Vice-President Dan Quayle 
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Figure ‎1-1.  Map of current-day political boundaries for Latin America 
Source: CIA 2008 
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1.1 PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION 
 
Supply chain strategies are increasingly needed on the international and global level 
with the slow but steady economic homogenization occurring in today’s world.  As 
the United States dollar weakens and other countries continue to make political and 
economic strides, the BRIMC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, and China) 
continue their growth while others only slightly farther on the horizon begin to 
prepare for a place on the world stage. 
 
Whether or not the introductory quote was actually one of Dan Quayle’s many 
misstatements (I could find no reliable source and he has been misquoted before), it 
still speaks humorously and accurately to Americans’ lack of understanding of our 
southern neighbors despite their proximity and potential influence.  Much of the 
focus of today’s supply chain literature, when discussing emerging markets, is on 
China – for good reason.  Unfortunately, this results in relative neglect of other 
regions with interesting challenges and economic potential – one of which is Latin 
America (though the region’s economic powerhouses of Mexico and Brazil do garner 
some attention as members of BRIMC).  From a United States perspective, Latin 
America is more geographically accessible and culturally similar than Asia.  China’s 
closest urban center, Shanghai, is farther from Los Angeles than Latin America’s 
farthest Pacific coast urban center, Santiago, Chile.  London is 70% further from New 
York than Baranquilla, Colombia.  Panama is also a crucial country to international 
trade and the United States Navy, not necessarily because of their economy, but 
rather because of the Panama Canal.  The Canal requires costly maintenance and 
upgrades to keep up with global trade growth, which should encourage the 
international community to ensure that Panama keeps pace with global economic 
development.  In many ways, Latin America may be more attractive to business than 
some BRIMC countries from an institutional perspective.  Chinese markets are 
overextended and supported by the government while its regulations and human 
rights policies are increasingly in the international spotlight.  Nearby, Russia’s future 
economic growth potential is becoming more and more circumspect due to an 
increasingly stymied ‚democracy‛, heavy-handed state control of the media, and 
 16 
 
overt high-level corruption.  These reasons, along with a simple personal interest and 
appreciation for the region, are what motivate my focus on Latin America. 
 
In researching the area, no comprehensive perspective could be found on the region 
as a whole and information proved to be scarce and difficult to find in many cases.  
There are excellent sources addressing very specific elements of Latin America but 
lack a greater context.  Others paint broad strokes across each of its larger countries 
while failing to present the details necessary for more than a surface understanding.  
Among them are interesting reports on logistics performance, global 
competitiveness, investment attractiveness, and corruption.  However, the 
dimensionless indices they often produce, sometimes with questionable 
methodologies, are merely instant gratification and oversimplifications unless one 
commits to understanding and analyzing each contributing variable and then placing 
this information within a larger topical, regional, and sometimes global context. 
 
Americans have been notorious for trying to move into foreign markets with our 
domestically-driven perceptions and understandings of operations and behavior.  A 
fortunate result of globalization has been an improvement of American savvy in this 
regard and this thesis is meant for those looking for insights into Latin America and 
the logistical context in which the region operates, particularly as concerns 
transportation. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will cover basic information on the region.  The next 
chapter focuses on regional integration efforts and other policies and influencers of 
the supply chain.  Chapter three quickly covers the most notable natural challenges 
to Latin American supply chains, followed by a thorough treatment of regional 
infrastructure in chapter four.  Chapter five then brings all of the previously 
discussed supply chain factors together to discuss hemispheric network implications 
for various product types.  The included ‚future research‛ section describes some 
other ideas that could easily stem from the information and insights within this 
thesis. 
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1.2 BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC DATA 
 
To better facilitate our understanding of the region, let us make some high-level 
comparisons along the lines of demographics and the size of the economies that 
make it up.  Using the map below as a reference, we will frequently categorize 
Mexico in with Central America, though you will see later that this is not a perfect 
pairing.  Therefore, in our discussions, the region from Panama to Mexico (with the 
exception of Belize) will be Central America.  All of the landmass south of and 
including Colombia we will consider South America (with the exception of the 
Guyanas, which are the three small territories of Guyana, Suriname, and French 
Guiana). 
 
In terms of population, Brazil makes up over half of South America with almost 200 
million people.  Mexico is also a regional juggernaut with over 100 million, dwarfing 
the rest of Central America which cumulatively can only claim 40 million.  Generally 
speaking, population correlates to land area with the exceptions of Bolivia which has 
a much lower and El Salvador which has a much higher population density. 
 
 
Figure ‎1-2.  Population of Latin America (millions) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
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Figure ‎1-3.  Population of Central America (millions) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
 
Figure ‎1-4.  Population of South America (millions) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
The size of the population surely impacts the size of the economy, but only to the 
degree that a country maintains a strong currency and high levels of trade and 
production.  Figure ‎1-5 presents 2007 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through 
purchasing power parity (PPP).  The countries are listed in order of population size 
so that correlative inconsistencies are evident.  A table of other countries is also 
provided for benchmarking purposes. 
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Figure ‎1-5.  GDP purchasing power parity of Latin America (USD billions) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
 
Table ‎1-1.  GDP purchasing power parity of select non-Latin American countries (USD billions) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
GDP is a snapshot indicator of a single country’s impact on the global economy and 
the influence that country holds.  To better understand the economic situation of the 
people of a country, it is important to determine the GDP per capita.  Figure ‎1-6 
provides this data with the countries again listed in order of population. 
 
Per capita GDP is necessarily an average.  In order to better capture the distribution 
of income within a country we turn to the Gini Index.  A perfectly even distribution 
of income in a country would create a linear cumulative diagram.  Of course no 
society looks like this and instead curves fall underneath this benchmark with 
general concavity.  The Gini index measures the difference between a country’s 
cumulative income curve and the perfectly linear benchmark line.  The index is 
simply the percentage of the area under the benchmark line that is captured by this 
US 13,860            
China 7,043               
UK 2,147               
South Africa 468                  
Hong Kong 293                  
Portugal 232                  
Sudan 108                  
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gap.  Therefore, higher indices tell of higher income disparities within a country.  
Latin America scores exceptionally poorly on this metric.  Of the 126 countries that 
the UN’s Human Development Report gives a Gini index for, Latin American 
countries fall between the ranks of 81 (Nicaragua) and 121 (Bolivia), most falling 
below 100.  
 
 
Figure ‎1-6.  GDP purchasing power parity per capita (USD) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
 
1.3 MAJOR DATA SOURCES AND INDEXES 
 
In this thesis there are a number of indices, reports, and data sources used.  The 
major ones that are constantly used and referred to are in Table ‎1-2 for quick 
reference. 
 
 
Table ‎1-2.  Major data sources and indexes used 
Acronym Name Creating Organization
--- CIA World Factbook US Central Intelligence Agency
BPI Bribe Payers Index Transparency International
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency International
GCI Global Competitiveness Index World Economic Forum
IGQI Infrastructure Gap Quality Index World Economic Forum
IPIAI Infrastructure Private Investment Attractiveness Index World Economic Forum
LPI Logistics Performance Index World Bank
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
2 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
International supply chains are strongly affected by relationships and agreements 
between countries as well as the various domestic economic policies and business 
environments.  While the social norms and basic culture of Latin America are much 
more similar to the United States than one might encounter in other regions of the 
world such as China, similar advantages are not necessarily as easy to come by in the 
administrative realm. 
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Figure ‎2-1.  Map of population densities in Latin America (2000) 
Source: CIAT 2005 
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2.1 REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS 
 
When concerning oneself with supply chains in a global context, international 
politics, policies, and regional and free trade agreements are major factors to 
consider.  Consequences of international policies range from understandable, such as 
companies being driven to postpone production into Brazil due to their labor 
protection taxes, to the absurd, such as companies finding it cheaper to send 
domestic product outside and then back in to China before selling it domestically.1  
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread and sometimes 
successful efforts to liberalize and reduce international barriers to trade around the 
world and in Latin America. 
 
This thesis refrains from delving into the macroeconomic theory and implications 
behind international trade agreements, but understanding their influence on supply 
chain considerations and having an historical perspective are important.  There are 
different types and levels of trade agreements, however, so we will take just a 
moment to define important vocabularies. 
 
Bela Balassa of Johns Hopkins University laid much of the framework for 
understanding economic integration in his text The Theory of Economic Integration.  
He described five successive stages of economic integration. 
 
1.  Free Trade Area 
This refers to a group of countries that have eliminated trade quotas 
and tariffs among themselves.  Some mistakenly use the term Free 
Trade Zone (FTZ) synonymously with Free Trade Area.   An FTZ is a 
specially exempt zone within a country (Shanghai’s FTZ in Pudong, for 
example) that enjoys trade-based and bureaucratic exemptions, often 
with the intention of attracting foreign investment.  Another 
complication is that a Free Trade Area is often referred to as a 
                                                 
1 Source:  Blanco 2008 
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Preferential Trade Area (PTA) where the quota and tariff barriers are 
only reduced or only apply to a small subset of goods. 
2.  Customs Union 
As with each successive stage, a customs union includes the elements of 
the previous stage (in this case the Free Trade Area).  In addition, a 
customs union adds the requirement that all participating countries 
maintain the same common economic tariffs (CET) and regulations on 
imports from countries outside the union. 
3.  Common Market 
 This is a customs union with free movement of people, capital, and 
goods between countries. 
4.  Economic Union 
 The economic union adds the harmonization of key economy-affecting 
policies, such as safety regulations or even a shared currency. 
5.  Complete Economic Integration 
 This is the final stage, sometimes dubbed a political union, since this 
stage is achieved when a supranational body is created to control 
economic and monetary policy.1 
 
The stages mentioned above are based on conventional theory and when applied to 
reality, are often less than perfect.  Nevertheless, they provide a useful foundation 
with which to begin describing the basics of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and more 
comprehensive trading blocs.  It is also worth mentioning that Balassa believed that 
in order to achieve higher levels of economic integration, deeper social and cultural 
integration is necessary. 
 
Latin American countries have had their eye on economic integration for two-
hundred years, but the efforts were not attempted in earnest until the 1950s and 60s.2  
The result of their efforts thus far is a slew of acronyms, ever-shifting allegiances, and 
                                                 
1 Source:  Harri 2003 
2 Source:  Meléndez O. 2001 
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only mixed progress.  Rather than cover each country’s or agreement’s story 
independently, it is more useful to briefly address the topic from a temporal 
perspective.  Caribbean developments are mentioned in passing because of the 
Caribbean’s geographic proximity and minor economic influence on our definition of 
Latin America.  Table ‎2-1 is a list of acronyms provided for quick reference. 
 
 
Table ‎2-1.  List of regional association acronyms 
 
2.1.1 THE 1950S & ‘60S 
The first truly meaningful integration efforts were made in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  In 1958, the West Indies Federation was created.  (At the same time the most 
basic framework of what is today the European Union went into effect with the 
Treaties of Rome.)  The West Indies Federation, a plan for political union comprised 
solely of British Caribbean colonies, was a short-lived precursor to later economic 
relationships.1  Only two years later, in 1960, Central American Common Market 
(CACM) was formed and Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was 
signed.  CACM began with Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
having the obvious goal of achieving at least a common market and, more 
ambitiously, a full political union. 2   LAFTA began as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia, and Ecuador signing the Treaty of 
Montevideo.  (Sources cannot agree on when Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, or 
                                                 
1 Source:  CARICOM 2008 
2 Source:  Meléndez O. 2001 
Acronym Name Comment
ALADI The Spanish derived acronym for LAIA
ALBA Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas Comprised of the most Leftist Latin American countries
AP Andean Pact
CACM Central American Common Market
CAFTA Central American Free Trade Agreement
CAN Andean Community of Nations Also commonly just called the Andean Community
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association
DR-CAFTA Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade Agreement
G3 Group of Three The three originally being Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association
LAIA Latin American Integration Association Frequently refered to by its spanish name as well, ALADI
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market Deriving from the Spanish: Mercado Comun del Sur
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
UNASUR Union of South American Nations Also called UNASUL from the Portugese
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Venezuela joined LAFTA, but generally it appears that Colombia and Ecuador joined 
in the early 1960s and Bolivia and Venezuela in the late 1960s.)  Both agreements 
successfully came into effect over the following years.  It is important to realize that 
in the 1950s and 60s, regional trade agreements were undertaken with protectionism 
in mind, rather than greater global economic involvement as is the case today.  This 
was aligned with ECLAC’s model for the region (the UN’s Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean). 
 
 
Figure ‎2-2.  Map of regional association memberships (1963) 
 
A few years after LAFTA regulations started in 1962, the West Indies Federation 
dissolved.1  The next year, Costa Rica joined CACM.  Picking up where the West 
Indies Federation ended, CARIFTA (later to become CARICOM) was formed in 1965 
to maintain ties between Caribbean countries.  The Caribbean Free Trade Association 
initially included only three countries, one of which was Guyana.  In 1968, as 
                                                 
1 Source:  CARICOM 2008 
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CARIFTA came into effect, eight more Caribbean countries joined.  CARIFTA was 
formed as no more than a limited free trade area.1 
 
Over barely a half-dozen years, CACM had become a huge success.  Tariffs had been 
eliminated for 95% of intraregional trade and the common external tariff was applied 
to 90% of imports.  These numbers themselves mean nothing until one also realizes 
that trade was also booming.  (By 1970, trade had grown eight-fold within the 
region.)2  LAFTA, meanwhile, was failing.  One of the strengths of CACM was the 
relative economic parity of the member countries; LAFTA economies were highly 
disparate.  The result was more trade diversion (to the larger, more developed 
economies of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) than trade creation.  Another stymie of 
success was the simple fact that the group failed to execute its policies because 
countries were using every exception they could to maintain tariffs.3  In recognition 
of the failure of LAFTA, some of the Andean countries decided to band together to 
both strengthen their collective position against the larger economies as well as to 
create a more liberal and successful trade bloc.  Thus, in May of 1969, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia signed the Cartagena Agreement and created 
the Andean Pact (also sometimes called the Andean Group, Andean Community, or 
ANCOM).  The stated goal of the organization was to achieve an economic union.4 
 
Less than two months after the Andean Pact was created to strengthen South 
American trade, Central America found itself in crisis.  To oversimplify things, 
immigration disagreements in July 1969 erupted into the short Fútbol War between 
Honduras and El Salvador.  Honduras withdrew from CACM and although the bloc 
continued, its momentum was gone and trade logistics complicated. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Merrill 1992 
2 Source:  Merrill 1993 
3 Source:  Beaulac 1980 
4 Source:  Choi 1998 
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2.1.2 THE 1970S & ‘80S 
Through the 1970s, CACM trade continued to grow, but at a much slower clip than it 
had over the wildly successful ‘60s (three times increase compared to eight).1  A 
significant weakness of CACM had been exposed:  there was no efficient and 
accepted way for the bloc to handle trade disputes.  It also began to suffer from the 
economic imbalance problems (seen earlier in LAFTA) and Nicaragua’s increasing 
instability.2  Most consider CACM to have been dormant for all practical purposes 
over these next two decades.3 
 
 
Figure ‎2-3.  Map of regional association memberships (1971) 
 
In 1971, CARIFTA added Belize to its ranks. CARIFTA was not particularly 
successful, however, so two years later it became CARICOM (the Caribbean 
                                                 
1 Source:  Leitmann 1995 
2 Source:  Merrill 1993 
3 Source:  Urquidi 1993 
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Community).1  This change was based on the intent to further liberalize the bloc and 
form a common market.  Also in 1973, Venezuela joined the Andean Pact.  
Meanwhile, Chile was crumbling under the weight of economic depression, 
exploding inflation, and eventually a political coup by Pinochet.  Pinochet’s new 
government withdrew Chile from the Andean Pact in 1976 (becoming an observer 
only) as a shift in economic strategy, emphasizing bi-lateral FTAs and less 
protectionism.   
 
 
Figure ‎2-4.  Map of regional association memberships (1980) 
 
The 1980s ushered a regional depression unto Latin America, called the Lost Decade.2  
This, in conjunction with Nicaragua’s Contra War, caused CACM to disintegrate 
completely and intraregional trade plummeted from United States$1,100M in 1980 to 
United States$420M in six short years.3 
                                                 
1 Source:  Leitmann 1995 
2 Source:  Bernanke 2005 
3 Source:  Merrill 1993 
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By 1980, LAFTA also came to terms with its own failure and attempted to breathe life 
back into the huge bloc.  The result was ALADI (Latin American Integration 
Association, sometimes referred to as LAIA).  ALADI was a step backwards 1 , 
however, because it promoted bi-lateral agreements rather than uniform trade 
reduction and offered immense flexibility for member states to make separate 
agreements and set different tariffs for non-member countries. 2   The bi-lateral 
agreement reached in 1986 by Brazil and Argentina through the ALADI process 
would eventually evolve into MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur, translates to 
Southern Common Market).3  The decade ended with the United States and Canada 
entering into the bi-lateral FTA that would eventually become NAFTA. 
 
2.1.3 THE 1990S 
In 1991, the Treaty of Asuncion was signed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay to form MERCOSUR.  MERCOSUR’s goal, like so many trade blocs before 
it, was a common market or even economic union.4  That same year, Central America 
finally recovered itself enough to reinstate CACM, this time with limited inclusion of 
Panama along with a few more acronym-driven institutions.  In 1992, NAFTA was 
signed, bringing together the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  One year later, the 
free trade area went into full effect for the Andean Pact (excluding Peru) and CACM 
was pursuing expanded relations with most of the other trade organizations of Latin 
America.5  In 1994, NAFTA went into effect and United States-led discussions began 
in Miami about the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) whose purpose would 
be to achieve free trade across the entire Western Hemisphere. 
                                                 
1 Source:  Urquidi 1993 
2 Source:  Inter-American Development Bank 1998 
3 Source:  International Labour Office 1999 
4 Source:  International Labour Office 1999 
5 Source:  Merrill 1993 
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Figure ‎2-5.  Map of regional association memberships (1991) 
 
Halfway through the decade, Suriname joined CARICOM.  CARICOM entertained, 
though never completed, thoughts of developing a bi-lateral FTA with Chile, Latin 
America’s healthiest economy at this point due to its willingness to accept foreign 
investment.  Furthermore, CET’s went into effect for both MERCOSUR and a subset 
of the Andean Pact (Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador).1   Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Colombia also began the G3 trading bloc.  The year 1996 saw the Andean Pact 
become the Andean Community of Nations (CAN in Spanish) with a series of 
reforms that further integrated the bloc.2 
 
Throughout the trade liberalization process during the ‘80s and ‘90s, many Latin 
American countries implemented reactionary increases to their tariffs in response to 
                                                 
1 Source:  Choi 1998 
2 Source:  Salazar-Xirinachs and Robert 2001 
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domestic economic problems.  This limited the success of all trade blocs within the 
region, notably the resurgent efforts of CACM and MERCOSUR in the mid ‘90s.1 
 
One can easily see the South American dichotomy created by the CAN (Andean Pact) 
and MERCOSUR from Figure ‎2-5.  With the hope of uniting all of South America, the 
two groups began talks of a merger in 1999.  (Such negotiations were yet another 
indication of the failure of ALADI.)  This was also the year that Cuba joined the 
floundering ALADI and Hugo Chavez, who would have significant influence on 
future Latin American integration efforts, began his rocky and controversial 
presidency of Venezuela. 
 
2.1.4 THE 2000S 
The presidents of the twelve countries of South America, soon to be UNASUR, met in 
Brasilia in mid 2000.2  This meeting yielded Initiative for the Integration of the 
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) an ambitious, large-scale initiative 
funded by three global financial institutions and with the intent to improve 
infrastructure throughout South America.  The April 2001 Summit of the Americas in 
Canada witnessed large protests of the FTAA (and would be seen again in 2003).  In 
2001, the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) was another of the first projects like IIRSA to 
seriously address the infrastructure issues (discussed later) that were contributing to 
the lack of Latin American integration despite the continued political and economic 
efforts.  This program was created to finance mostly transportation and electrical 
infrastructure projects connecting southern Mexico to Colombia. 
                                                 
1 Source:  Choi 1998 
2 Source:  IIRSA 2008 
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Figure ‎2-6.  Map of regional association memberships (2000) 
 
A big year for trade agreements was 2004.  The CAN-MERCOSUR integration efforts 
(initially dubbed SAFTA), achieved a middling milestone with the signing of the 
Cuzco Declaration stating their intention to create UNASUR (the Union of South 
American Nations).  DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic—Central American FTA) was 
also signed between all of the CACM nations, the United States, and the Dominican 
Republic.  Also in 2004, Cuba agreed to exchange medicines, doctors, and other 
medical services for Venezuelan oil.  This was the beginning of ALBA (Bolivarian 
Alternative for the People of Our America), pushed by Chavez as an alternative for 
Latin America to the FTAA proposal being spearheaded by the United States.  The 
emphasis of ALBA is for social as well as economic integration.  ALBA was the 
formal manifestation of an ideological shift that has been slowly building in Latin 
America.  For all practical purposes led by Chavez, it is ideologically and vehemently 
opposed to the free trade continually proffered by the United States, and instead 
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simply seeks cooperative relationships as an alternative to these ‚neoliberal‛ 
international trade policies.1 
 
July 2005 saw a further baby step in making UNASUR a reality when the member 
countries of both CAN and MERCOSUR became associate members of the opposite 
bloc. 2   Venezuela’s Chavez complicated integration efforts the very next year, 
however, by withdrawing from CAN because of Colombia and Peru’s recent FTAs 
with the United States3 and also from the G3.  He immediately applied to gain 
membership in MERCOSUR, which is still technically pending due to some 
opposition in Brazil and Paraguay’s congresses at least partly because of concern 
about Chavez’s incessant confrontation with the United States, though it is generally 
referred to as a member.4  UNASUR took further structural form when, in December 
2007, it declared the creation of the Bank of the South and one month later 
determined that a formal treaty should be ready to sign by June 2008.  Another 
supranational bank, the Bank of ALBA, was founded on January 27, 2008. 
 
ALBA has grown to include Nicaragua and Bolivia and clearly represents some of 
the most leftist countries of Latin America.  ALBA’s growth has been analogous with 
Chavez’s increasing influence over the region which is slowly following his anti-free 
trade, anti-United States lead.  MERCOSUR, in particular, has been flirting with a 
shift from free trade policies, which is interesting since MERCOSUR has consistently 
failed at implementing free trade in the first place.  Like all of the other blocs, it has 
employed reactionary tariffs in response to domestic economic problems, but 
MERCOSUR more than other blocs (with the exception of CACM in the late ‘60s) has 
witnessed immense politicization of its organization.  Internally, member countries 
of MERCOSUR have been in constant contention over various disputes, most 
recently the Argentina-Uruguay conflict over a paper pulp mill installation5, and 
                                                 
1 Source:  Márquez 2007 
2 Source:  Decision 613 of the Andean Community 2005 
3 Source:  Kennedy 2007 
4 Source:  El Universal 2008 
5 Source:  Osava 2008 
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before that quite a bit of tit-for-tat policies between Brazil and Argentina.  Externally, 
MERCOSUR seems to be shifting away from trade and more into a political 
association, again in line with Chavez’s increasing involvement in the bloc.1 
 
 
Figure ‎2-7.  Map of regional association memberships, LAFTA excluded (2008) 
 
March 2008 saw serious strains put on Colombia’s relations with both Venezuela and 
Ecuador because of a unilateral Colombian strike just across the Ecuadorian border 
against FARC, the group that has been waging a decades-long rebellion against 
Colombia’s government.  Chavez proved again to be a danger to economic 
development in Latin America by mobilizing his army to the Colombian border, 
recalling and expelling ambassadors (as did Ecuador), and threatening to expel or 
nationalize many foreign-owned businesses.2  Relations were quickly normalized, 
making the situation seem more like posturing and rhetoric, though such situations 
                                                 
1 Source:  Klonsky and Hanson 2007 
2 Source:  Suggett 2008 
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should raise serious questions for companies thinking of investing in the northern 
Andean nations, particularly Venezuela. 
 
2.1.5 SUMMARY 
After discussing the choppy and slow progress of Latin America’s integration efforts, 
there are geopolitical trends to take note of.  The first half of the twentieth century 
was marked with strong protectionist and import-substitution policies throughout 
Latin America.  Beginning really with the 1960s, Latin American countries began to 
open their economic borders to other countries, but only with the region.  This 
formation of regional trade blocs was based mostly on economics and determined by 
geography.  Most all would be considered failures and largely culminated in the Lost 
Decade.  The 1990s then began to see more of the region embrace globalization which 
really began taking hold of the region at the turn of the century.  At this same time, 
however, strong voices of opposition to such free trade movements cropped up 
throughout the region led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and his increasing influence 
due to the global economics of oil (of which Venezuela is a major exporter).  The 
resulting friction between the leftist governments of the region and those that 
maintained close relationships with the United States and participated in free trade 
policies has pressed the regional blocs farther from economics and into politics.  
Geographies no longer play as strong of a role in membership decisions as they once 
did, though they still exist to an extent. 
 
For instance, among South American countries, regional integration efforts were 
originally premised on economics (though some level of political and administrative 
integration would sometimes be a distant goal) and based on physical geographies 
delineated by the Andes Mountains and Amazon Rainforest.  Increasingly, we are 
seeing a regional shift to a more comprehensive effort to integrate societies and 
cultures as well as economies, based on political leanings and alliances.  This is 
leading to lessened importance on geographical proximity and changing how South 
American countries interact with each other.  ALBA is the most direct example of 
this, but can also be seen by the growing tensions in both CAN and MERCOSUR 
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which were founded on economics and geographic proximity, and raise questions 
about the future tractability of UNASUR. 
 
In order to maintain a focus on a higher-level perspective of the region as a whole 
and avoid going too deeply into politics or economics, we only discussed select 
events in the previous sections.  Not mentioned was much of the political turmoil 
that has embroiled the region for decades or countries attaining associate member or 
observer status within a bloc.  There were also a number of related organizations and 
agreements not mentioned above.  There is plenty of literature available, however, if 
one is interested in a much more detailed accounting of Latin America’s geopolitical 
and economic evolution.  Here, instead, we formed the overall regional context 
necessary when considering international supply chain applications.  We conclude 
the section by discussing some of the outliers to complete the picture. 
 
Mexico and Panama (and Chile to an extent) have frequently participated with Latin 
American treaties only as observers, evidenced by ALADI, CAN, and MERCOSUR, 
or in some other limited capacity such as Panama’s involvement with the second 
incarnation of CACM.  Mexico and Panama have not entered into UNASUR 
discussions to date.  This information makes the CACM and DR-CAFTA borders that 
much more interesting.  Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa 
Rica have proven to consistently regard each other in a unified fashion as a five-
nation bloc in various forms, while Mexico and Panama have resisted participation.   
 
Mexico has shown far more interaction with the United States and South America 
than the Central American countries.  This is mostly due to the extreme difference in 
economic development, which we saw was the initial death pang of LAFTA.  
Panama’s separation from the CACM countries is both historically and economically 
ideological.  The history reaches back to 1823 when the five future CACM countries 
formed a single country fashioned after the United States, the Federal Republic of 
Central America.  This federation was short lived, but stands to show that these 
countries are much more the same than they are different.  Economically speaking, 
Panama is more supportive of free trade than the other Central American countries, 
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despite what it may seem from its lack of RTA membership.  Panama has resisted 
both CACM and CAFTA because it has chosen to pursue more liberal FTAs with 
countries on a bi-lateral basis, rather than be restricted to trade regulations of 
CACM’s bloc.   
 
Belize, another regional anomaly, falls into much the same category as the Guyanas, 
the three ‚non-South American‛ countries of South America:  Guyana, Suriname, 
and French Guiana.  Belize is the only country of Central America where English is 
the official language, with actual usage a blend between mostly Spanish, English, 
and a local Creole variant.  Culturally, linguistically, and economically the Guyanas 
have even less in common with Latin America, often aligning themselves with 
Caribbean countries as we saw earlier.  Uncharacteristically, they are, however, a 
part of the UNASUR negotiations (excepting French Guiana, which is only an 
extension of France and thus not a sovereign country but rather a part of the EU). 
 
 
2.2 MONETARY POLICY AND FISCAL STABILITY 
 
Some economies are currently far more stable than others in terms of inflation and 
some countries have seen extreme booms and busts due in part to their fiscal policies.  
Monetary policy has been drastically different from country to country in Latin 
America.  The general cost of money throughout the region is also an important 
factor describing economic health and volatility which can wreak havoc on supply 
chains. 
 
In recent history, Latin America has trailed the rest of the globe in terms of 
controlling its inflation.  There is no formal definition of hyperinflation, but the term 
generally refers to fast and extreme periods of inflation.  We will arbitrarily refer to 
any level of inflation over 200% as hyperinflation.  This would mean that prices at 
least triple in only a year.  Hyperinflation has both obvious and subtle consequences.  
An interesting result of hyperinflation on the supply chain is that the most basic 
inventory control concept, the minimization of required inventory levels, becomes 
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completely wrong.  Since prices are increasing so quickly under hyperinflation, the 
best business practice is to store as much inventory as possible at all times, especially for 
domestically sourced goods, since the cost of production would be drastically higher 
the next day, and the goods will be significantly appreciating in value over the 
course of days (or even hours in the most extreme cases). 
 
As it turns out, hyperinflation was one of the few economic problems that Central 
America mostly avoided.  The 1950s, ‘60s, and into the ‘70s saw relatively negligible 
inflation rates because Central American countries all kept their currencies pegged to 
the United States dollar until the 1980s.1  Since then, most of them have changed 
currency regimes frequently, battling through inflationary pressures during the Lost 
Decade.  Nicaragua, and Mexico to a lesser degree, had particular trouble in the ‘80s 
and into the ‘90s.  Nicaragua’s inflation peaked in 1988 at over 14000%.  They finally 
regained control of their economy after pegging to the dollar again in 1991. 
  
                                                 
1 Source:  Kim and Papi 2005 
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Figure ‎2-8.  Historical annual inflation of Central America (extended scale) 
Sources: Antonio Ocampo, Angela Parra, and Bergés 2003; Data and Statistics 2008 
 
 
Figure ‎2-9.  Historical annual inflation of Central America (reduced scale) 
Sources: Antonio Ocampo, Angela Parra, and Bergés 2003; Data and Statistics 2008 
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South America, on the other hand, maintained their currencies independent of the 
dollar and had many more problems with inflation than did Central America. 1  
Inflation surges across the region are too many to list individually.  Generally 
speaking, from 1950 until recently there has always been high inflation somewhere in 
South America.  The 1950s were most challenging for Paraguay and Bolivia, both 
peaking with inflation levels between 100% and 200%.  The 1960s were a little better, 
with Uruguay and Brazil leading the region with annual inflation of around 100%.  
Inflation started pounding South American economies in the 1970s.  Uruguay 
continued fighting the 100% mark, but Chile and Argentina both jumped over 400% 
that decade.  The Lost Decade of the 1980s and leading into the 1990s was a brutal 
inflationary period.  Bolivia almost hit 12000% annual inflation, while Peru’s inflation 
peaked at over 7000% and both Argentina and Brazil experienced around 3000% 
inflation.  The other South American countries, however, were generally able to keep 
inflation under 100% over the same period, though some flirted with that mark.  
South America made a successful Herculean effort in the mid ‘90s to reign in their 
hyperinflation and have since commendably followed smart monetary policies to 
stabilize and control inflation.  Latin America’s trailblazer in the way of fiscal, 
monetary, and economic policy has turned out to be Chile.  Chile experienced a crisis 
(relatively minor considering its peers) in the early 1970s during a time of serious 
political unrest and Pinochet’s eventual coup.  Before the 1970s, Chile’s inflation was 
well above average.  During the early 1970s, though, the country’s political unrest 
came to a head with Pinochet’s successful coup.  Very high levels of inflation 
challenged Pinochet’s early years leading Chile, but his free-market ideology and 
openness to foreign trade helped Chile recover and send it down a path of constant 
fiscal improvement to become South America’s most fiscally stable country.  
Colombia is also worth mentioning in that they have never let inflation rise over 33% 
in the 68 years of data that was compiled. 
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Taylor n.d. 
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Figure ‎2-10.  Historical annual inflation of South America (extended scale) 
Sources: Antonio Ocampo, Angela Parra, and Bergés 2003; Data and Statistics 2008 
 
 
Figure ‎2-11.  Historical annual inflation of South America (reduced scale) 
Sources: Antonio Ocampo, Angela Parra, and Bergés 2003; Data and Statistics 2008 
 
Generally speaking, all of Latin American countries have done an excellent job of 
stabilizing their financial systems over the past decade.  There are still weak spots 
and crises that crop up, such as Argentina’s bankruptcy of 2002 and Venezuela’s 
inability to find single-digit inflation levels like the other countries, but it is still a 
vast improvement.  Ben Bernanke, future Chairmen of the United States Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, identified some of the factors responsible for the 
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region’s mid-90s recovery.1  He determined that the most impacting (but not only) 
tool used was inflation targeting.  He clarifies, however, that the root causes were 
threefold and fundamental.  First, the region began adopting responsible fiscal 
policies and tending to their foreign debt levels.  Secondly, the region undertook 
better regulation of their banking systems and thus improved both domestic and 
foreign trust in that sector of the economy.  Lastly, many countries handed more 
autonomy and independence to their central banks, allowing them to operate 
unencumbered with the politics-of-the-day and thereby permitting them to more 
easily consider longer horizons in policy decisions.  Although I am optimistic that the 
region is now developing quickly and seemingly on the right path, it is important to 
note that we are talking about over a dozen countries, and some will unquestionably 
be more successful than others in improving their economies.  The current trends and 
policies are also still young and the region has not yet attained the political stability 
of the United States or Europe, so investors still bear some level of risk that the 
region will retreat from the current direction.  Hugo Chavez’s current influence and 
ambition in the region is another potentially destabilizing factor to be wary of as a 
supply chain engineer dealing with the region. 
 
 
2.3 LATIN AMERICA’S SUPRANATIONAL BANKS 
 
Beyond national economic and financial systems lie supranational banks, also called 
development banks.  Most famous are the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  They serve as creditors to nations and often as overseers and advisors of 
the global financial system.  There are also many development banks specifically 
targeted towards Latin America.  The largest are the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) which also serves the Caribbean, the Central American Bank of Economic 
Integration (CABEI) serving only Central America, and the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF).  In Latin America many countries, in particular those led by 
leftist leaders such as Bolivia and Venezuela, consider the World Bank, IMF, and 
                                                 
1 Source:  Bernanke 2005 
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even the IDB to be controlled by the United States.  In addition, these banks’ policies 
tend to promote globalization and free-trade.  Latin America’s leftists label these 
policies neo-liberalism and have expressed vehement opposition.  In recent attempts to 
break free of the largest existing development banks, Hugo Chavez has succeeded in 
rallying support for two supranational banking institutions specifically for Latin 
America.  The first was the slightly more moderate and inclusive Bank of the South 
and the second was the leftist and currently exclusive Bank of ALBA.  The goal of 
these institutions is to significantly reduce the United States’s influence on the region 
by creating banks large enough to allow the region to bypass the World Bank, IMF, 
and IDB.  Infrastructure development is a common usage of development bank 
funds. 
 
 
2.4 OTHER INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
The previous discussion of Latin America’s attempts at economic integration should 
have made apparent the frequency and seeming caprice with which the region’s 
international policies can change.  This is an obvious challenge for international 
supply chains that operate in the region because of the resources required to monitor 
the constant changes and understand their business implications.  In addition, long 
term planning initiatives, legal requirements, and bureaucratic upkeep are also a 
resulting challenge of such unstable administrative environments.  Latin American 
countries also present many internal challenges for supply chain engineers that are 
generally not found in developed countries.  
 
2.4.1 CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY 
Corruption can take many forms:  governmental favoritism, judicial partiality, 
unethical corporations, bribes and kickbacks in regard to any of the above, and an 
influential black market (also called a parallel or informal economy).  While no 
country is immune, developed countries’ ability to marginalize these activities is part 
of what has strengthened their economies; in the absence of corruption, ethical 
businesses are more willing to invest and operate. 
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In the matter of corruption, Latin America shows room for improvement.  While the 
region does not suffer to the extent of Africa or South Asia, it is still a long way from 
the United States or Europe.  There are a number of indexes that attempt to quantify 
corruption in different ways.  The World Bank provides the Logistics Performance 
Index (LPI).  Their research does not concentrate exclusively on corruption, but 
includes a survey of international logistics professionals and experts.  Figure ‎2-12 
and Figure ‎2-13 present first the impact of bribery on specific regions and second the 
perceived three-year trend experienced.  Most of the LPI scores are by country, but 
the corruption-specific data has been aggregated so that we cannot remove the 
included Caribbean countries from Latin America, therefore we are also registering 
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana.  It is important to realize that 
the regions include only developing countries, and the developed countries from all 
regions fall under ‚High Income Countries‛.  Therefore Japan, the EU, the United 
States, et cetera are not being included within any geographical regions. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-12.  Surveyed impact of bribery (% responses of high/very high) 
Source: Arvis et al. 2007 
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Figure ‎2-13.  Three-year trend of governance and corruption (% responses of better/much better) 
Source: Arvis et al. 2007 
 
Transparency International provides the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a very 
comprehensive index measuring corruption exclusively.  The CPI allows us to look 
more specifically at individual countries amongst the 180 that it surveys.  Table ‎2-2 
provides the 2007 CPI scores, ranks, and percentiles for Latin American countries as 
well as some other benchmark countries.  The following chart displays the CPI 
scores.1  Chile and Uruguay are in the same class as higher-income, more-developed 
countries.  Costa Rica has not come quite that clean, but still manages to separate 
itself from the rest of the pack.  From there the rest of the Latin American countries 
slide into a morose.  There does not appear to be a distinction between Central and 
South American countries. 
 
                                                 
1  Note that throughout this thesis, whenever possible, we will use orange to represent Central 
America, green to represent South America, and blue to represent non-Latin American countries to 
better facilitate quick surveys and better understanding of the information.  In regionally aggregated 
data the non-Latin American countries are again blue, but Latin America will be red. 
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Table ‎2-2.  CPI scores, ranks, and percentiles 
Source: Lambsdorff 2007 
 
 
Figure ‎2-14.  CPI scores: higher score = less corruption 
Source: Lambsdorff 2007 
 
Score Rank Percentile
Germany 7.8 16 91%
Japan 7.5 17 91%
USA 7.2 20 89%
Chile 7.0 22 88%
Uruguay 6.7 25 86%
Costa Rica 5.0 46 74%
Cuba 4.2 61 66%
El Salvador 4.0 67 63%
Colombia 3.8 68 62%
Brazil 3.5 72 60%
Peru 3.5 72 60%
Mexico 3.5 72 60%
China 3.5 72 60%
Panama 3.2 94 48%
Argentina 2.9 105 42%
Bolivia 2.9 105 42%
Guatamala 2.8 111 38%
Nicaragua 2.6 123 32%
Honduras 2.5 131 27%
Paraguay 2.4 138 23%
Ecuador 2.1 150 17%
Venezuela 2.0 162 10%
Sudan 1.8 172 4%
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Transparency International also provides a less expansive Briber’s Payers Index 
(BPI).  This index only captures the world’s 30 largest exporters and thus only 
Mexico and Brazil from Latin America.  The index communicates the international 
pervasiveness of bribery by companies based in a particular country.  A higher score 
would mean that that country’s companies participate less in bribery worldwide.  
Mexico lands clearly in the middle and Brazil straddles the third and fourth quartiles 
– neither impressive positions, but both ahead of China and India. 
 
2.4.2 CUSTOMS 
Trouble with customs can fall into the arena of corruption and bribery, but can also 
stem from oft changing regulations, sluggish bureaucracy, and systemic inefficiency.  
Compared to the rest of world, Latin America’s customs operations do not compare 
favorably with that of high-income countries, or even Europe1 & Central Asia.  It is 
not the laggard that Africa is, however.  Figure ‎2-15’s block of graphs on the 
following page presents Latin America’s performance in a variety of categories that 
the LPI has regionally aggregated.  It has been arranged such that the better 
performers are always farther to the left of the graph. 
                                                 
1 We refer, in line with LPI categorization, only to the countries in Europe that are not in the ‚High-
Income‛ category. 
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Figure ‎2-15.  Various customs-related regional comparisons 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
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It is mentionable that Latin America performs well in the three categories related to 
communication.  Operationally Latin America does not do as well, reaching no 
higher than the middle of the pack and often falling to the back, ahead of only Africa.  
Determining Latin America’s rank only among the developing countries of other 
regions, however, can prompt overly-low expectations and shortchange the region’s 
potential.  The difference between Latin America and the high-income countries 
should be noticed as well.  Figure ‎2-16, also derived from the LPI, provide further 
instances of how Latin America compares to other regions and how far it trails the 
developed countries in terms of customs logistics. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-16.  Further customs-related regional comparisons 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
 
Some LPI survey data is presented by country and allows us to understand how 
individual countries are performing.  Figure ‎2-17 displays the time it typically takes 
to clear customs.  Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador are the clear 
laggards of the region – all South American countries.  When looking at the import 
and export costs to get through customs in Figure ‎2-17 we can see that Colombia’s 
charges are excessive despite its poor performance.  This is likely due to Colombia’s 
strategic location and lack of seaport infrastructure.  As we will discuss later, ground 
transport is exceptionally difficult in South America.  Colombia straddles Panama, 
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gaining access to both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.  Any shipper unwilling to pay 
or wait for the Panama Canal, or too large to use it, might consider Colombia to be 
one of the most logical port destinations for an intermodal continuation of the 
shipment. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-17.  Average time it takes to clear customs (days) 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
 
 
Figure ‎2-18.  Typical import/export costs, includes both transport and port costs (USD) 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
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2.4.3 VIOLENCE AND THEFT 
Latin America has yet to find the political and societal stability that most developed 
countries have attained.  Colombia has been waging a slow-burning civil war for 
forty years with rebel forces using guerilla warfare and roaming the logistically 
strategic but undeveloped dense rainforest of the Darien Gap across the Colombia-
Panama border.  Both Bolivia and Ecuador went through political crises as recently 
as 2005 in which their presidents were forced to step down in the face of massive 
violent protests.  In Paraguay there has been violence targeting its soy farmers for 
years.1  These are just some examples of the political instability of the region. 
 
Organized gangs of bandits can be a threat to the supply chain and Latin America is 
a primary battle ground.  Barry Conlon, president of FreightWatch International 
USA, named four current global foci for theft and hijackings.  Two of them, Mexico 
and Brazil, are Latin American.2  In a 2005 survey given by the Center for Private 
Sector Economic Studies (CEESP), 94% of 2600 Mexican executives named safety 
from robbery, crime, and kidnappings as a significant obstacle to business 
development.  This concern was the most mentioned and received the highest 
average significance of all other government- or market-related obstacles.  Mexico’s 
black market was the third-highest rated and mentioned obstacle.3 
 
2.4.4 TRANSSHIPMENTS & TRUCKING REGULATIONS 
Common policies requiring transshipment of ground freight at country borders is a 
hindrance to surface transportation, which we will see in chapter three is already 
problematic.  Due to unsynchronized vehicle regulations, differing drivers licensing, 
and continued (though lessened) protectionism policies, many semi-trucks cannot 
travel from country to country.  Rather they must meet a truck from the destination 
country at the border and exchange the cargo there.  This incorporates extra travel 
time and logistical complexity into the supply chain. 
                                                 
1 Source:  Dangl 2006 
2 Source:  Supply Chain Digest 2007 
3 Source:  Carranza Torres 2007 
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Other trucking regulations, or in some cases a lack of, also creates a challenge for the 
region’s supply chains.  For example, what little exists of Brazil’s trucking 
regulations is completely ignored resulting in anti-competitive and unsafe practices.  
The fact that over 50% of Brazil’s truckers are self-employed serves to feed this 
problem and helps create a ground transportation sector that is based on low cost 
and low efficiency.1  In contrast, only about 13% of United States truckers were self-
employed in 2002. 2   Brazil’s roads are thus filled with trucks that are too old, 
overloaded, uninspected, and being driven by unrested and unregulated drivers.  
This results in an unsafe environment, low accountability and reliability, and 
extraordinary wear and tear on already poor roads.  Brazil is only one example, but 
generally indicative of most of the rest of Latin America. 
 
  
                                                 
1 Source:  Fleury 2007 
2 Source:  Global Insight, Inc. 2005 
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3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
Even after considering the institutional and systemic supply chain challenges in Latin 
America, significant challenges still remain.  The region’s geography is at the same 
time both amazing and foreboding.  Its various components provide some 
exceptional challenges to the creation of an effective or even functional supply chain.  
But in some cases, geographical advantages can be found. 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-1.  Satellite image of Latin America 
Source: Comsat International 2006  
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3.1 THE ANDES MOUNTAINS 
 
The United States contends with the Rocky Mountains and Europe with the Alps, but 
neither compares to the Andes Mountains.  The range stretches from Chile and 
Argentina’s southernmost region of the continent all the way up along the western 
coast to the northern coast of Venezuela.  At 9000 km it is the longest range in the 
world and runs twice the width of the United States.  Aconcagua stands in Argentina 
as its tallest peak at 6960 meters.  By comparison, Mount Everest, the tallest point in 
the world, rises 8850 meters and the tallest mountain in the Rockies is Mount Elbert 
at 4400 meters; over fifty of the Andes’ peaks are over 6100 meters.  Only the 
Himalayas of Asia is considered a bigger range, though it isn’t nearly as long. 
 
The Andes Mountains serve to effectively isolate the western coast of South America 
from the rest of the continent, including the economic powerhouse of Brazil, its active 
São Paulo seaport, and the highly industrialized Argentina.  The Andes house many 
of the continent’s largest cities such as 
Bogotá, La Paz, and Quito and the majority 
of the world’s highest cities of notable size 
are in the Andes.  In 2007, FIFA even banned 
international matches from Bogotá, La Paz, 
and Quito due to their elevation.1  To impress 
upon the reader the challenges that the 
Andes Mountains present, Figure ‎3-3 and 
Figure ‎3-4 have been provided to allow a 
rough comparison of South America to the 
United States.  They present the average 
elevation, ordered by population, of the 17 
largest metropolitan areas of each region 
along with the two highest sizeable 
metropolitan areas with the highest 
                                                 
1 Source:  USA Today 2007 
Figure ‎3-2.  Map showing the Andes 
Source: EROS 2006 
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elevations (Denver and Albuquerque in the United States, and Quito and La Paz in 
South America).  This represents, roughly, 40% of the United States’ population and 
30% of South America’s population.  The average elevation for these United States 
cities is 335 meters while the average South American elevation is 838 meters.  The 
standard distributions are 494 and 1147 meters, respectively. 
 
 
Figure ‎3-3.  Elevation of populous US cities (meters) 
Source: Wikipedia, various 
 
 
Figure ‎3-4.  Elevation of populous South American cities (meters) 
Source: Wikipedia, various 
 58 
 
The Andes Mountains make it especially difficult to build and maintain roads and 
railways.  The costs are high and once the roads are in, it still takes disproportionate 
amounts of time to traverse relatively small distances because of the routes and 
windings that the mountains dictate.  For this reason, air transport has become 
increasingly used in order to bypass the Andes, with Colombia and Peru having best 
developed their air routes.1 
 
Other mountains exist in southern Venezuela (the Guyana Highlands), Brazil (the 
Brazilian Highlands), and Mexico/Central America (the Sierra Madres).  The Guyana 
Highlands are defined by their unusually high mesas, yet the tallest reach only 2800 
meters.  The Brazilian Highlands similarly peak out at 2900 meters and are formed 
generally between the populated southeast and northeast regions of the country.2  
Mexico is riddled with mountains, which can get as high as 5700 meters.  The 
maximum elevations of the Central American countries range from 4200 meters in 
Guatemala to 2400 meters in Nicaragua.3  Given how narrow the region is, these 
mountains dominate much of the terrain. 
 
 
3.2 THE AMAZON RAINFOREST 
 
Another physical obstacle for Latin American supply chains is the Amazon 
Rainforest.  The Amazon Rainforest takes its name from the massive Amazon River 
and covers most of the Amazon Basin and about a third of all of South America.  
Another comparison for perspective:  The Amazon Rainforest would cover two-
thirds of the contiguous United States.  Most of it lies within Brazil, but it maintains 
significant portions in every other South American country from Bolivia on 
northward.  There is, of course, no clear cut way to draw the borders of the Amazon 
Rainforest, but Figure ‎3-5 gives a rough representation of it (as well as the Central 
                                                 
1 Source:  Encyclopedia Britannica Online, ‚Colombia‛ 2007 
2 Source:  Lydolph 1985 
3 Source:  CIA World Factbook 2008 
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American Rainforest).  The rainforest is widely believed to provide 20% of the 
world’s oxygen and to house the greatest collection of biodiversity in the world.1  In 
less than forty years, we have cleared nearly 20% of the forest’s 1970 cover.2,3 
 
 
Figure ‎3-5.  Map of rainforests in Latin America 
Source: Butler (Rainforest Map) n.d. 
 
The Amazon River claims the rainforest and slightly beyond as its watershed and is 
the most voluminous river in the world and some contend it to also be the longest.4  
The Nile is generally considered the longest, but the Amazon has such an extensive 
system of tributaries and different interpretations of the river proper, that it ends as a 
matter of perspective and definition.  The river has over 1000 tributaries, seven of 
                                                 
1 Source:  Corwin 2007 
2 Source:  Butler 2007 
3 Source:  Corwin 2007 
4 Source:  Duffy 2007 
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which flow for over 1600 km.1  It is a 12th-order stream by the Strahler Stream Order 
algorithm which measures the magnitude of a river network, the highest realized 
order.2 
 
While the Amazon River and Rainforest are natural marvels of beauty and life, they 
are also formidable foes of supply chain networks.  While not non-existent, the road 
system piercing the Amazon Basin is negligible and largely a smattering of unpaved 
roads.  These unpaved roads are even more worthless than most because of the 200 
days and 100 inches of annual rainfall the region sees.3  Increased awareness of 
environmental impact prevents development of transport corridors, so the supply 
chain operators are left with the headache of always working around or over the 
rainforest.  The less destructive option of using its powerful river system exists, but is 
currently underutilized.  There is also the amazing fact that the Amazon River, at no 
point, is crossed by a bridge.4 
 
Central America also has a lush rainforest.  It does not approach the enormity of the 
Amazon, but has already seen even higher rates of deforestation.5  Alternatively, the 
deforestation of the rainforest in Panama is making it harder and harder to maintain 
the Panama Canal6 – a rare direct correlation between maintenance of environment 
and infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 Source:  WorldAtlas 2008 
2 Source:  Strahler 1952 
3 Source:  WorldAtlas 2008 
4 Source:  Augelli 2007 
5 Source:  Butler, ‚Neotropical‛  2006 
6 More on this in the Panama Canal section of chapter four. 
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4 INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
Challenges abound beyond the geophysical.  The Andes Mountains and Amazon 
Rainforest are troublesome for supply chain engineers, but nothing much can or 
should be directly done about them.  Here we present the current condition of Latin 
American infrastructure.  Where something is lacking, as we’ll see in Latin America, 
there can be great opportunities for investment.  The challenge is that it has been 
financially difficult and sometimes risky to capitalize on those opportunities.  
Progress is being made, but unfortunately, it is being made too slowly. 
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Figure ‎4-1.  Map of road networks across Latin America 
Source: CIAT 2005 
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The overall LPI score is comprised of various subcategories (customs, infrastructure, 
international shipments, logistics competence, tracking & tracing, domestic logistics 
costs, and timeliness).  Of the 150 countries’ LPI scores, Chile and Argentina lead 
Latin American countries in infrastructure at 32nd and 45th on the list, respectively.  
Thirteen Latin American countries dominate the rankings from 54th to 82nd.  Bolivia 
and Nicaragua bring up the rear at 107th and 122nd.  These rankings are decidedly 
middle-of-the-road and are a good indicator of the different levels of development 
interwoven throughout the region. 
 
 
Table ‎4-1.  Overall LPI scores and ranks (of 150 countries) 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
 
The subcategory most tangibly applicable to transportation is infrastructure.  The 
scores and ranks (out of 150 countries) for this subcategory are shown in Table ‎4-2.  
The numbers are actually quite similar to the overall LPI results, with the biggest 
exception being a 29-place drop by Guatemala.  In fact, by comparing the rankings of 
the two tables we can see for which countries infrastructure is a weakness and for 
which it is a strength, relative to their other logistics factors.  Picking out the 
countries with double-digit swings between the two tables, Brazil and Venezuela’s 
infrastructure are relative strengths, but it drags down Guatemala and Nicaragua.  
Quartile Country Score Rank
Germany 4.1 3
USA 3.8 14
China 3.3 30
Chile 3.3 32
Argentina 3.0 45
Panama 2.9 54
Mexico 2.9 56
Peru 2.8 59
Brazil 2.8 61
El Salvador 2.7 66
Venezuela 2.6 69
Ecuador 2.6 70
Paraguay 2.6 71
Costa Rica 2.6 72
Guatemala 2.5 75
Uruguay 2.5 79
Honduras 2.5 80
Colombia 2.5 82
Russia 2.4 99
Bolivia 2.3 107
4th Nicaragua 2.2 122
Overall LPI
1st
2nd
3rd
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Note that this does not mean that these countries’ infrastructure is good or bad, it is 
only a relative comparison to their other logistical components measured by the LPI.  
Chile may be the only Latin American country to break into the top quartile, but it is 
encouraging that the majority of the rest of Latin America maintains position in the 
second quartile.  As we will see in the ensuing sections, however, the GCI data 
(which is used because of its ability to break down into quality-by-mode) is much 
less rosy.  See 
    Table ‎4-3 for how the GCI ranks its infrastructure pillar (out of 131 countries). 
 
  
Table ‎4-2.  LPI infrastructure rankings 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
     
    Table ‎4-3.  GCI infrastructure rankings 
    Source: Arvis, et al. 2007  
  
  
The red lines between the tables match the countries from one table to the next.  We 
can see at a glance drastic differences between the two tables.  In the following 
sections we use GCI variables to indicate modal quality per country (which are used 
with other like-mode variables to build pillars, which in turn roll up into the GCI 
score).  The GCI’s choice of variables is at times circumspect, so while we use selected 
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variables in the coming sections, we should be careful to quickly accept the GCI’s 
aggregated pillar.  Another factor which can explain the drastic quartile differences 
between the two indexes (though does not explain the ranking shuffle) is the fact that 
each index considers countries that the other does not.  The GCI includes 9 countries 
not in the LPI, and the LPI includes 29 countries not in the GCI.  Many of the latter 
are African countries thus improving the overall rankings of most Latin American 
countries.  Probably the biggest issue with trusting the LPI scale is the high ranking 
of Paraguay which, as we will see soon, is in dire straits with its infrastructure. 
 
Exploring not current conditions, but rather trajectory, one of the LPI’s many survey 
questions to executives was if they believe there has been improvement in regional 
infrastructure and telecommunications (two separate questions).  Figure ‎4-2 and 
Figure ‎4-3 show that Latin America finds itself below average in both categories.  
Infrastructure, though, is an umbrella term for a complex system with many 
components, so we will discuss it in more detail using four subgroups:  roadways, 
railways, waterways/seaports, and airports.  This thesis is focusing on direct factors 
influencing logistics transportation; therefore we will not address 
telecommunications past this point. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-2.  Three-year trend of transport infrastructure quality (% responding positive) 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
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Figure ‎4-3.  Three-year trend of telecommunications infrastructure quality (% responding positive) 
Source: Arvis, et al. 2007 
 
 
4.1 ROADWAYS 
 
The road systems across Latin America are notoriously poor.  Most countries 
struggle to provide adequate connectivity and quality and have historically build 
their surface networks (both road and rail) out to the coasts rather than towards 
surrounding countries, which further challenges efficient intraregional trade.1   It 
should come as no surprise that the Andes and Amazon both play a role in 
hampering many countries’ efforts along these lines.  While there is no perfect way to 
objectively compare differing countries’ road networks, below we present a graph 
that gives the reader a rough impression of the road network differences between 
countries.  The Latin American countries are on the left and some international 
benchmarks are on the right, each group ordered by urbanization level from most to 
least. 
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Meléndez O. 2001 
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Figure ‎4-4.  Road per 1000 people (kilometers) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
From the chart we can see the vast difference between the developed and developing 
world when it comes to infrastructure.  Of Latin America, only Mexico and Paraguay 
achieve even a 50/50 split in paved and unpaved roads.  All other countries find 
themselves largely unpaved.  The mountain roads, of which the Andes contain 
plenty, often make sharp turns, require winter chains, and have no guardrails.  
Companies accustomed to operating their supply chains in the United States will 
find a much different comparative transportation landscape in Latin America.  
Including Alaska (which will make things look rosier in Latin America than they 
are), the United States is only half the size of Latin America, yet has ten times as 
many kilometers of paved road and almost as many kilometers of unpaved road.    In 
all, the United States has 654 meters of road per square kilometer, whereas Latin 
America has only 146.  Note that these are pure kilometers, not lane-kilometers 
which would certainly translate into an even greater skew towards the United States. 
 
It is important to clarify that I am not suggesting that Latin America must build their 
road networks to United States levels for the sake of the supply chain.  I am bringing 
up Latin America’s lesser connectivity (as compared to the United States) in order to 
impress upon the reader the fact that Latin American logistics cannot be approached 
in the same way, or with the same expectations, as those of the United States and 
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Western Europe.  For the sake of the Amazon and the Central American rainforests, 
we should be careful in our fervor for building infrastructure that could threaten 
these global and regional assets.  What is unarguably essential to Latin America’s 
ability to support the supply chains of increasing trade and globalism is the 
maintenance and quality of the roads already in place.  Latin America is notorious 
for its poor roads, particularly outside of the major cities.  This slows transportation, 
increases the physical toll on trucks thus shortening their lifespan and/or increasing 
maintenance costs, and increases damage-in-transit to products. 
 
There are a number of large, notable highways that have been or are currently being 
built, with the intention of improving trade routes and transcontinental movement, 
often with international and IDB support.  These include, but are not limited to, the 
Pan-American Highway, the Trans-Amazon Highway, and the Interoceanic 
Highway.  It should be mentioned that, where the term ‚highway‛ in the United 
States almost always refers to a paved road, it is very common for even major 
highways in Latin America to be unpaved. 
 
The Pan-American Highway was the first road built of the ones listed here. 1  
Discussions of the highway began in the 1920s.  It stretches along various routes 
(depending on the source) from Alaska all the way to Argentina, with the exception 
of 87 kilometers – the Darién Gap.  The construction of this final piece of the highway 
through the Darién Gap is highly contentious with politicians and trade advocates 
facing off against those with environmental concerns for the extraordinarily lush 
rainforests there.  The section dubbed the Inter-American Highway, which is the part 
running through Mexico and Central America, was completed during World War II 
with the assistance of the United States.  In South America, Brazil’s Trans-Amazon 
Highway opened in 1972.  As the name implies, it runs through the Amazon Basin 
from the Atlantic towards Peru, though some refer to the Trans-Amazon Highway as 
a system of highways and others specify Br-230 or some other east-west route 
through the northern section of Brazil.  This highway is causing much of the 
                                                 
1 Source:  Alloway 1994 
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deforestation of the Amazon, in part because of the construction of the highway 
itself, but mostly because of the ensuing development that has taken place along it.  
Further connecting Peru and Brazil is the Interoceanic Highway which is still under 
construction.  It effectively connects the Pacific coast of Peru to some eastern 
Brazilian coastal cities.  Figure ‎4-5 presents the rough locations of these highways. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-5.  Map of major transnational Latin American highways 
 
Focusing on Brazil and Mexico for a moment because of their economic dominance of 
Latin America in terms of GDP, and their more available data, we are able to explore 
some further details.  Brazil’s development has logically concentrated along its coast 
like the rest of South America.  This is for the obvious reason of port accessibility, but 
also because of the Amazon Rainforest dominating its interior.  Its highway network 
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carries 60% of Brazil’s tonnage-miles.  The figure above presents the extent and 
condition of Brazil’s highway network in 2004 as given by Brazil’s National 
Transportation Council.  The quality scale can be seen in the legend with dark blue 
being the best and red being the worst (excellent, good, deficient, bad, and 
unacceptable, in that order).  The Trans-Amazon Highway is largely missing from 
this map.  You can see that the best roads are concentrated around the capital, São 
Paulo, and that the best roads are all in the southeastern region. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-6.  Map of detailed Brazilian road quality 
Source: CNT 2007 
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Mexico’s road network is easily one of the most developed in Latin America.  It has 
the most paved roads in the region, ahead of the much larger Brazil and the generally 
considered industrialized Argentina, and has the third highest proportion of paved 
roads to square-kilometers behind the much smaller countries of Costa Rica and El 
Salvador.1  Probably not surprisingly, Mexico’s wealth and road development are 
focused largely in the northern region near the United States.2  The political and 
tourist centers of the DF and the Yucatan, respectively, also have healthy GDP per 
capita numbers, although the road development is mixed in both.  Mexico, like 
Brazil, also sees its logistical efficiency reduced by a high proportion of independent 
truckers. 
 
 
4.2 RAILWAYS 
 
If Latin America is simply underdeveloped in terms of highways, its rail 
infrastructure is challenged by a nearly impossible situation.  When discussing roads, 
there are really no incompatibilities to address because of the relative independence 
of the vehicle to the right-of-way.  Rail, however, is another matter.  In the United 
States, all rail is of a single type: 1.435 meter standard gauge.  Throughout Latin 
America, however, you have no such consistency, seriously hampering the efficiency 
and usefulness of what little rail infrastructure exists.  Almost universally throughout 
Latin America, the 1990s became a period of rail privatization and concession 
granting, which has saved the mode in many countries. 
 
It is useful to spend just a moment discussing the different types of tracks.  There are 
dozens of different gauge tracks (measured as the distance between the inner edges 
of the parallel tracks).  Standard gauge is 1.435 meters and by far the most common, 
                                                 
1 Source:  CIA World Factbook 2008 
2 Source:  Carranza Torres 2007 
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globally speaking. 1   North America, Europe, the Middle East, and China are 
predominantly standard gauge.  Anything wider than standard is called broad 
gauge, and anything smaller is narrow gauge.  Broad gauges offer more stability and 
speed, while narrow gauges are cheaper and can handle better.  Seven different 
gauges can be found throughout South America, three of these in Central America 
(including non-operational tracks, of which we will explain more later).  Table ‎4-4 
and Table ‎4-5 show kilometers of track by country and by gauge as measured by the 
CIA World Factbook 2008.  These are not to be taken at face value without reading 
the rest of this section, since these numbers do not differentiate between operating 
and defunct tracks.  You will notice that Table ‎4-4 does not have columnar totals or 
percentages.  This is because of the extreme non-functioning of Central American rail 
(only Mexico and to some level Panama have anything remotely useful in terms of 
rail).  The Central American countries in red have no current rail operations.  Break-
of-gauge is a term to indicate the point at which two tracks of differing gauge meet.  
A rack railway is used for steep inclines and has a mechanism running up the center 
to help pull the train up the tracks. 
 
 
Table ‎4-4.  Rail infrastructure in Central America by gauge (kilometers) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Encyclopedia Britannica Online, ‚Gauge‛ 1998 
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TOTAL
Mexico -           -           17,665     -           -           -           -           17,665     
Guatemala -           -           -           -           -           886           -           886          
El Salvador -           -           -           -           -           562           -           562          
Honduras -           -           -           279           -           420           -           699          
Nicaragua -           -           -           6               -           -           -           6               
Costa Rica -           -           -           278           -           -           -           278          
Panama -           -           77             -           -           278           -           355          
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Table ‎4-5.  Rail infrastructure in South America by gauge (kilometers) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
Mexico’s rail system is arguably the best in all of Latin America because of three 
compounding factors.  First, it has one of the better networks in terms of coverage.  
Second, it uses standard gauge throughout the country.  Third, it operates over 
international boundaries.  Since the United States is exclusively standard gauge, 
Mexico has proven to be wise in its choice of rail development.  Because of Central 
America’s failures to use a constant gauge and to maintain their rail infrastructure, 
Mexico has absolutely no operating connection with Guatemala, its geographical 
conduit to the rest of Latin America.  As such, Mexico’s only rail operations are 
domestic or with the United States.  In fact, Central America is so destitute of rail that 
it forms an almost insurmountable obstacle to hemispheric rail continuity.  Mexico 
privatized its rail system in the late ‘90s1 and saw steady growth in the tonnage of 
freight moved via rail from 2001 to 2005, from about 75 million to about 90 million.2  
This privatization encouraged private investment into the networks, but has also 
created some logistical complication, especially in the transfer of goods from 
company to company since the companies own specific routes.  Mexico used to have 
a Central American connection through Ciudad Hidalgo into Guatemala.  Since 
Guatemala uses a different gauge, the warehouse just across the Guatemalan border 
                                                 
1 Source:  McManus 2008 
2 Source:  Carranza Torres 2007 
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TOTAL
Argentina 20,858     -           2,885       -           7,922       -           237           31,902     
Brazil -           5,328       194           -           24,169     -           -           29,691     
Chile 2,831       -           -           -           3,754       -           -           6,585       
Bolivia -           -           -           -           3,504       -           -           3,504       
Colombia -           -           150           -           -           3,154       -           3,304       
Uruguay -           -           2,073       -           -           -           -           2,073       
Peru -           -           1,726       -           -           263           -           1,989       
Ecuador -           -           -           966           -           -           -           966          
Venezuela -           -           682           -           -           -           -           682          
Paraguay -           -           36             -           -           -           -           36             
TOTAL 23,689     5,328       7,746       966          39,349     3,417       237          80,732     
29% 7% 10% 1% 49% 4% 0%
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supported both gauges and transshipment had to occur.  The line to Guatemala still 
exists but no longer operates after Hurricane Stan damaged it in 2005.  The company 
in charge of that line could not find reconstruction support from the Mexican 
government and is therefore abandoning its Chiapas-Mayab concession.1 
 
Guatemala’s example illustrates the challenges of developing rail infrastructure in 
much of Central America.2  As was common with most Central American countries, 
its rail system was built up during the early twentieth century but later fell into 
disrepair and was shut down entirely in 1996.  Because of the country’s political and 
financial instability, neither private entities nor IDBs were willing to invest in 
Guatemala except RDC, an American company that focused on developing countries.   
 
 
 
    Figure ‎4-7.  Map of Guatemalan rail 
    Source: Metzger 2006 
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Railway Gazette, ‚Central America‛ 2007 
2 Source:  Thomas 2007 
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In 1997, RDC and some local partners were granted a 50 year concession as CODEFE, 
later to become Ferrovías Guatemala (FVG).  In only ten years, however, despite 
increasing utilization and freight movement, Guatemalan rail was shut down once 
more.  The Guatemalan government had refused to uphold its contractual 
obligations, thus causing financial and operational hardships for FVG, and Hurricane 
Stan had destroyed the only connecting rail to Mexico, which the Mexican 
government refused to help reconstruct.  When FVG took its complaints to the 
Guatemalan government, the government repossessed the rolling stock which 
caused FVG to take its case to arbitration through DR-CAFTA. 
 
Guatemala is a clear example of the unfriendly environment that private investments 
can find in Central America and is just the first in a long string of broken railway 
links throughout the region.  Guatemala did have a line crossing into El Salvador and 
reaching San Salvador – even matching gauges – but that line is no longer 
operational.  In fact none of El Salvador’s over 550 kilometers of track have been in 
operation since 2005 due to a lack of maintenance;1 the unused network, however, is 
extremely robust at over 26 meters of track per square kilometer (second to this is 
Uruguay with a distant 12 meters of track per square kilometer).  Honduras’s system 
only exists along the northern coast of the country, consists of 280 and 420 kilometers 
of 1.067 and 0.914 meter gauge tracks (respectively), never crosses any international 
borders, doesn’t even approach Tegucigalpa (the country’s capital and largest city), 
and is currently only partially operational.  Nicaragua had almost 400 kilometers of 
rail at one point, but the country’s rail industry and infrastructure has been 
collapsing for decades.  Currently no rail companies operate in the country and only 
6 kilometers of track still even exist.  The same story continues in Costa Rica, where 
almost 300 kilometers of rail exist (all 1.067 meter gauge) but, according to the CIA, 
none are in use.  Panama is only slightly better, with barely 20% of its 355 kilometers 
of rail in use.  The other 80% is being dismantled and put to the construction of roads 
and bridges or have been stolen by looters.2  The operating section, the Panama Canal 
                                                 
1 Source:  CIA World Factbook 2008 
2 Source:  Alicia Rivera 2003 
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Railway, is claimed to be the oldest transcontinental railroad in the world, running 
from Panama City on the Pacific, to Colón on the Atlantic.1  First run by the United 
States, then the Panamanian government (1979-1998), it is now privately owned and 
operated.  While the non-functioning sections were narrow gauge, the Panama Canal 
Railway was originally constructed as a broad gauge track but was reconstructed as 
standard gauge in 2000.  The Darien Gap was mentioned for its lack of roads earlier, 
and this applies to rail as well – there is no infrastructure linking Panama and 
Colombia in any way.  In summary, no rail operates over international borders in 
Central America (discounting the United States/Mexico border). 
 
In some cases, South American rail resembles its Central American counterparts.  In 
others, South American rail has become a relatively reliable mode of transport, much 
like in Mexico.  The next figure presents the region’s current situation pictorially.  
The area of each pie represents, proportionally, the total kilometers of track within 
that country, according to the 2007 CIA World Factbook.  Not all of the represented 
rail is currently in operation, but this is not as epidemic a problem as seen in Central 
America so it was left on the map.  It was also left on the map because many 
countries in South America have real plans to rebuild much of their inoperable 
tracks, though some do not.  The pie slices indicate the share of each country’s rail 
that is of a particular gauge.  The area of each slice is also proportional to actual 
kilometer measurements. 
                                                 
1 Source:  Panama Canal Railway Company 2005 
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Figure ‎4-8.  Map of South American rail prevalence and gauge-split 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
First a short summary of each country’s rail situation, and then we will speak a little 
more holistically of the continent.  In Colombia, the standard gauge rail seen is a 
state-owned mine-to-port connection.  The rest of the rail, all 0.914 gauge, connects 
many cities and ports throughout the country, yet is only half operational.  Frequent 
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landslides are to blame for much of the inoperable lines.1  Colombia is investing 
heavily in rail improvements and expansions, however. 2   Venezuela, with an 
unoperated connection with Colombia, currently has minimal rail lines, but is also 
investing heavily in expansion.3  Ecuador’s rail was originally a relatively decent 
network, connecting Quito and some of the southern region to two coastal ports, 
though there are no international connections and the gauge is entirely unique 
within South America.  Through a lack of attention, landslides, and El Niños, the 
tracks have become largely unusable.  Ecuador’s government has with renovation, 
and has come up with attractive propositions that foreign investors are interested in, 
but has had trouble materializing the plans and funding.4  Also, some portions of the 
rail carry steep grades through parts of the Andes5, making freight even less viable.  
In Peru we begin to see more, better, and functioning railways.  There are basically 
two unconnected networks in Peru.  The northern network connects Callao on the 
coast to Lima, after which it eventually branches both north through more cities to 
the coal mines of Goyllarisquizga, and south to Huancavelica.  Incidentally, the RDC, 
mentioned earlier in the Guatemala fiasco, is involved in the operation of these lines.  
The last section of the Huancavelica branch is currently being regauged from 0.914 to 
standard to match the rest of the line.  The other micro-network connects the port city 
of Matarani to Arequipa, Cuzco, and across Lake Titicaca by ferry into Bolivia.  This 
is all standard gauge except for the 0.914 meter portion extending past Cuzco 
utilizing switchbacks up and then down to Machu Picchu. 
 
Bolivia brings us to our first of two landlocked countries in Latin America and of the 
entire Western Hemisphere.  Since South American logistics is deeply reliant on 
ocean freight, being landlocked is an extraordinary disadvantage.  We haven’t found 
it necessary to mention the geopolitical territory changes that have taken place over 
                                                 
1 Source:  Encyclopedia Britannica, ‚Colombia‛ 2007 
2 Source:  Railway Gazette, ‚Colombia‛ 2007 
3 Source:  Construction & Maintenance 2006 
4 Source:  Sacco 2008 
5 As steep as 1 in 18, which means that the track rises 1 meter over the course of 18 meters.  An incline 
of 1 in 100 is generally considered steep by rail standards and cuts feasible payloads in half. 
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the centuries, but one that is interesting to note is that Bolivia (and Peru) once owned 
coastland that is today Chile.  It was lost to Chile during the War of the Pacific 
around 1880, yet to this day Bolivia maintains a navy in Lake Titicaca.  As did much 
of the rest of Latin America, Bolivia privatized its rail in the 1990’s.  Like Peru, 
Bolivian rail is operated by two different companies: FCO (Ferroviaria Oriental) and 
FCA (Ferroviaria Andina).  Both rail operations are cleanly described as operating in 
the southeast and southwest quadrants of the country.   
 
Unlike nearly all Latin American countries already discussed, Bolivia has made a 
point of establishing and maintaining international rail connections, likely due to its 
landlocked position.  Oriental Rail’s network emanates from Santa Cruz in two 
branches, one eastward into Brazil and another southward into Argentina.  The only 
non-operating portion of rail is a branch leading away from Bolivia’s second city, 
Santa Cruz, northward towards Trinidad.  A current project is underway to 
rehabilitate this section of rail and then continue on to finally connect with Trinidad.  
Andina Rail connects La Paz and many other major cities with Peru, Chile, and 
Argentina, with access to a couple north Chilean coastal ports.  Bolivian rail is also 
blessed with complete gauge uniformity.  Not only does this make all of their tracks 
networkable with much of Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, but also allows them to join 
their currently disconnected internal networks, making Bolivia one of the better 
connected Latin American countries in terms of rail.  Once the systems are connected, 
it will create a fully connected railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific.   
 
Paraguay, on the other hand, does not contend with the Andes or the Amazon, yet 
has only managed to keep 36 kilometers of rail operational serving an international 
crossing at its southeastern border with Argentina. Being landlocked with virtually 
no rail network and the lowest per capita GDP in South America, Paraguay is not an 
attractive offering to supply chain managers. 
 
The remaining countries all have quite well-developed rail networks for Latin 
America.  Chile, the healthiest and most open economy, Argentina, often considered 
the most industrialized country, and Brazil, the largest economy, support over two 
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dozen operating companies, with Uruguay using its central location to these 
countries to serve as an effective hub for the region (discussed more in the 
Waterways section).  Chile’s rail system incorporates numerous east-west branches 
from its expectedly north-south spine, often called the Longitudinal Railway, 
particularly the section south of Valparaiso.  These excursions serve to connect the 
central rail artery with over a dozen ports, two Bolivian crossings, and one northern 
Argentinean crossing.   
 
Chile uses narrow 1.000 meter gauge mostly in the north, compatible with Bolivia.  A 
second Argentinean crossing, not operating and farther south than the first, near 
Santiago, is a narrow gauge rack rail to get through the Andes, meaning that each 
end has a break-of-gauge where it meets the 1.676 meter rail which is predominant in 
southern Chile and much of Argentina.1  A third connection between the countries is 
being worked on farther south between Lonquimay, Chile and Zapala, Argentina.2   
 
Argentina’s rail network clearly uses Buenos Aires as its nexus, with Rosario, a 
distance farther up the Rio Paraná, as another central rail location.  Argentinean rail 
also serves a number of other ports, the Chilean, Bolivian, and Paraguayan crossings 
we already mentioned, a crossing each to Brazil and Uruguay, and a vast interior 
network of cities almost entirely in Argentina’s northern half. This northern region of 
Argentina is where the population and development concentrates, with particular 
rail density through a central belt of the country pushing west from its northern 
coast.3  North of this central belt one finds mostly 1.000 gauge track, facilitating 
connection with Chile and Bolivia, but the majority of the network is made up of the 
broad 1.676 meter gauge track.4  Argentina boasts the greatest amount of rail of any 
Latin American country and continues to invest in its network and rolling stock.5   
 
                                                 
1 Source:  Se Construye 2006 
2 Source:  Preston 2005 
3 Source:  Sharp 2005 
4 Source:  Railway Gazette, ‚Rail industry‛ 2007 
5 Source:  International Railway Journal 2008 
 81 
 
Uruguay also sports a well connected rail network mostly grown out of Montevideo, 
though track also leads from a few other port cities.  The track spiders to Argentina 
and Brazil, though not always passing over the border.  The drawbacks are that 
Uruguayan rail does not integrate well with most of the surrounding countries since 
it uses only standard gauge, and that some of the secondary branches and 
connections to the more minor port cities are no longer carrying freight.1 
 
This brings us finally to Brazil.  In terms of rail, Brazil resembles Argentina in the 
multitude of concessionaires, very similar total rail (both approximately 30,000 
kilometers), and international connectivity.  As previously mentioned, Brazil 
connects with its southern neighbors Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay, but none of 
the north Andean countries because of the Amazon.  Brazil uses predominantly the 
narrow 1.000 meter gauge track, causing breaks-of-gauge in the Argentinean and 
Uruguayan connections.  Bolivia, remember, uses all 1.000 meter track.  The network 
expectedly concentrates around the coastal areas like the population – mostly in the 
southeast and northeast.  A couple very long lines are currently planned and built 
into the depths of the Amazon, though not quite as far as any of the Andean 
countries.  Brazil, like Mexico, has problems related to the number of rail companies 
operating in the country, stemming from regulations that do not encourage 
cooperation or collaboration.2 
 
Latin America’s scarcity and poor quality of roads and railways, as well as how 
disjointed the rail networks are, paints a bleak picture for Latin America’s surface 
transportation.  Up to this point, the discussion has been centered primarily on the 
coverage, availability, and connectivity of the networks.  To put some context on the 
quality, we will use the detailed data behind The World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI).  Cognizant of the point-of-reference problem inherent 
in a survey-based comparison study such as the GCI, it is still one of the best and 
most comprehensive measures we have to measure something as difficult to quantify 
                                                 
1 Source:  Líneas Férreas Uruguayas 2008 
2 Source:  Fleury 2007 
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as infrastructural quality.  Table ‎4-6 and Table ‎4-7 present the average answer given in 
each country by asking executives to rate their roads or rail from 1 to 7.  Note that the 
worst one can do is 1, not 0.  Orange countries are Central America/Mexico, green 
countries are South America, and blue countries are global benchmarks.  The average 
score worldwide for road quality was 3.7, and for rail quality was 2.9.  Notable on the 
road table is that while Latin America underperforms, its countries are across the full 
spectrum; Chile and El Salvador break the first quartile while Paraguay and Bolivia 
languish at the bottom.  Central America also clearly has the superior roads to South 
America with a few exceptions.  Concerning the rail quality results, at first glance it 
seems to be the opposite.  But a closer look at the actual numbers reveals very little 
difference, only 0.7 points between 13 of the 17 Latin American countries.  What the 
rail results really reveal is that in sweeping terms, Latin America’s rail infrastructure 
is frighteningly poor.  While Panama, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina try to separate 
themselves from the pack, we cannot ignore the fact that not a single country beats 
the global average and that almost two-thirds of Latin American countries find 
themselves in the bottom quartile. 
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Table ‎4-6. GCI road quality rankings (mean 3.7) 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, et al. 2007 
Table ‎4-7. GCI rail quality rankings (mean 2.9) 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, et al. 2007 
 
These results are particularly distressing for Bolivia and Paraguay, who need to have 
efficient surface transportation to offset the disadvantages they face in being 
landlocked.  Landlocked countries contend with extra costs when importing and 
exporting goods beyond their neighbors since they must use other countries’ ports 
and must always cross through at least one other country, potentially resulting in 
extra tariffs, bureaucracy, and customs delays.  These disadvantages tend to manifest 
in lower levels of economic development which make it more difficult to invest in 
infrastructure, and the cycle feeds itself.  Fortunately for Bolivia, it has a respectable 
amount of operational track in place, although the quality is very poor.  Paraguay 
cannot claim even that much. 
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4.3 WATERWAYS AND SEAPORTS 
 
Waterways in Latin America consist of ports and rivers.  The unreliability and lack of 
surface transport connectivity options also hampers the effectiveness of Latin 
American ports.  Like the railroads, the region began promoting privatization of its 
ports en masse during the 1990s.  Many sources note the drastic productivity 
increases obtained from this over the past decade.  Examples are Brazil’s increase 
from approximately 12 containers per terminal per hour in 1995 to 38 just eight years 
later1, and Colombia’s 16 containers per vessel per hour pre-1993 to 25 in only four 
years.2  In addition, the abundance of rivers, or inland waterways, is an immense 
asset to the region, potentially offsetting some of the surface transport problems.  
This section also discusses the Panama Canal and its importance to both the region 
and the world. 
 
The CIA World Factbook coverage of ports is noticeably barren.  The most 
comprehensive source I found for international water infrastructure is the World 
Port Source website (WPS) run by Mark Waters.  The site provides a long list of ports 
in each country and provides a category, size, and satellite image for each, as well as 
contact information and statistics when available.  While Waters admits to the 
unavoidable subjectivity in some of the categorizations and size assessments, it still 
gives a sufficient barometer for a cursory regional overview and comparison.  For 
instance, some decisions fall into shades of grey when trying to determine if a port is 
a ‚large river port‛ or a ‚medium seaport‛ that happens to be just inside the mouth 
of a major river.  By focusing on types of infrastructure important to supply chain 
managers, we will consider only the river ports, seaports, and deepwater seaports as 
determined by the World Port Source.  In some cases, harbors could be feasible cargo 
destinations, but this is where the categorization begins to grey so we are not 
considering them.  Before we look at Latin American countries, let us first compare 
the entire region to the contiguous United States.  Ignoring river ports for just a 
                                                 
1 Source:  Fleury 2007 
2 Source:  Gaviria 1998 
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moment, Figure ‎4-9 compares their different types of seaport infrastructure.  Latin 
America clearly lags the United States by a simple quantitative comparison because 
of its lack of large and very large ports, but realizes a disparity arguably less 
pronounced than what we saw with roads (10:1 paved, 11:5 total) and rail (9:4 
including inoperable lines).  Latin America has nothing comparable in size to the 
ports of Houston (a very large seaport), Long Beach (a very large deepwater seaport), 
or the other eleven very large ports in the continental United States.  Nonetheless, the 
region’s ports look much better than do its rail systems, with some countries sporting 
world-class ports. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-9.  Number of Seaports: Latin America vs. USA 
Source: Waters n.d. 
 
In addition to quantity, we must consider the quality of infrastructure at the ports.  
Just as any other modal infrastructure, capacity is a function of both quantity and 
quality.  Unlike roads and rail, which are the creation of right-of-ways and network 
arcs, ports (and to a lesser degree, airports) are intermodal hubs and network nodes.  
Whereas road and rail infrastructure quality contribute to determining the speed and 
payload of transiting goods, port infrastructure quality impacts the speed and 
capacity of transferring goods.  There is an inherent intermodalism to port operations 
and this is a large part of the infrastructure needs.  Port infrastructure encompasses 
the technology and machinery needed to guide the ships to/from dock (tugboats), 
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unload cargo (gantry cranes, Portainers, etc.), process customs, and transfer these 
containers or bulk goods to trucks, trains, and warehouses (forklifts, sideloaders, 
etc.).  Quality will be discussed at the national level. 
 
Mexico is in a great position logistically speaking because it can easily be considered 
a geographical center for Asia, the United States, Europe, and South America.  
Adding to its hub potential is the generally short distance between its Atlantic and 
Pacific ports, which Mexico has invested in considerably, realizing its potential and 
the integral nature of an efficient port system, coupled with its tolerable surface 
transport environment.  According to WPS, Mexico has 1 in 5 of Latin America’s 
seaports (13) and 1 in 8 of its harbors (7).  Central America has much the same 
potential that Mexico does with such a central location and short expanses between 
the two oceans.  As we already know, however, the rail and roads of the countries 
are grossly insufficient for concentrated international use (excepting maybe Panama).  
Looking at their ports, Honduras’s largest port facility is a single small seaport and 
both Guatemala and Nicaragua have only a single medium harbor; Nicaragua’s has 
but one crane.  El Salvador has a medium seaport, but of course only accesses the 
Pacific coast, meaning that through-cargo would have the added complexity of 
crossing more international borders.  Costa Rica and Panama, on the other hand, 
each support medium seaports on both coasts.  Figure ‎4-10 maps out all of the larger 
Latin American ports. 
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Figure ‎4-10.  Map of medium and larger harbors, river ports, & seaports of Latin America 
Source: Waters n.d. 
 
The quality picture looks a little different, however.  According to the GCI, Panama 
has world-class port facilities 1 followed by Honduras.  Costa Rica squanders its 
geographical advantage by providing the worst ports of all of Latin America and 
ranking 100 out of 103 countries2. 
 
                                                 
1 Not surprising because of United States investments and long-standing presence in the Panama 
Canal. 
2 The GCI ranks 131 countries but I have re-ranked the list by removing the landlocked countries. 
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Table ‎4-8.  GCI port quality rankings (mean 4.0) 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, et al. 2007 
 
In South America, Colombia is the only country to enjoy highly advantageous 
exposure to both oceans since it straddles Panama.  (Technically speaking, Chile 
touches both oceans as well, but not in any practical way.)  Unfortunately, Colombia 
has only five seaports, river ports, and harbors combined.  The rest of South 
America’s Pacific coast houses 12 seaports, 5 river ports, and 10 harbors – the large 
majority of which are predictably in Chile which has embraced and promoted 
international trade more so than any other country of the continent.  The Atlantic 
coast is much better developed with Argentina and Brazil providing expected 
capacity, but Venezuela contributing perhaps surprisingly to the level of port 
infrastructure.  The Pacific coast (excepting already mentioned Colombia) has 2 
deepwater seaports, 31 normal seaports, 33 river ports, and 25 harbors.  Brazil and 
Venezuela generally dominate about equally in number of seaports, though Brazil’s 
are larger.  Argentina does however own the only two deepwater seaports of Latin 
America recorded by WPS.  Argentina has a large number of river ports (20 of the 
coast’s 33) because of the prominence of the Rio de la Plata and Paran{ River in 
relation to its populated areas.  Referring back to the earlier GCI table, one sees that 
Chile and Uruguay both have developed and maintained their ports better than the 
Quartile Country Score Adj Rank
Germany 6.5 4
USA 5.8 11
Panama 5.7 15
Chile 4.8 31
Honduras 4.7 37
Uruguay 4.3 46
China 4.0 55
Russia 3.7 58
Guatemala 3.7 59
El Salvador 3.5 66
Mexico 3.3 73
Argentina 3.2 76
Ecuador 2.8 83
Colombia 2.7 85
Brazil 2.6 93
Venezuela 2.6 94
Peru 2.4 98
Nicaragua 2.3 99
Costa Rica 2.2 100
Bolivia --
Paraguay --
3rd
4th
n/a
GCI: Ports
1st
2nd
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international average, and far better than any other South American country.  This 
follows the same pattern we saw with road quality and speaks to Chile’s decision to 
promote an attractive investment atmosphere and to Uruguay’s efforts to establish 
Montevideo as a hub to MERCOSUR. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-11.  Map of Argentinean cities with populations over 500,000 
Source: Brinkhoff 2007 
 
Figure ‎4-12 presents the quality of each country’s infrastructure discussed thus far.  
We can see by inspection a reasonable correlation between the different modes.  
Panama provides the best ports and rail of Latin America and Chile makes up for in 
roads what little it lacks elsewhere.  Paraguay’s situation appears almost hopeless 
unless it can find a way to attract significant investments in its infrastructure. 
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Figure ‎4-12.  Three-dimensional road, rail, & port quality comparison 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, et al. 2007 
 
Latin America’s geography is a hindrance in many ways.  It turns out to be a blessing 
for many countries, however, in terms of inland waterways.  While these are 
generally not suitable for ocean-going vessels, they have the potential to shoulder a 
significant portion of domestic freight or to connect international trade to and from 
the seaports with more inland parts of the region.  Not every country has an intricate 
navigable river network, but five of the world’s fifteen countries with the most 
kilometers of river are in South America with Brazil in third and Colombia in sixth.  
Calculating the river densities of countries in Latin America reveals that Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama are very rich in navigable inland 
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waterways.  Colombia, in particular, has an extraordinary resource in this because of 
its size.  The WPS does not have any river ports listed for Colombia, though.  
Hopefully there are some that have not yet been recorded there, but otherwise 
Colombia has an extraordinary unrealized potential.  Brazil also highly underutilizes 
its vast waterway resources.  It is estimated that Brazil utilizes only 60% of its 
navigable rivers, which have the unique benefit of curling deep into the Amazon.  
This characteristic is also part of the reason that its rivers see less traffic; there is less 
economic activity in the Amazon.  Regardless, only 1% of cargo in Brazil moves via 
inland waterways, also showing unrealized potential.1  
 
 
Figure ‎4-13.  Map of river density in Latin America (meters of navigable riverway per km2) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
 
4.4 THE PANAMA CANAL 
 
Panama is home to one of, if not the, largest and most difficult engineering projects 
in the world.  After others’ failed attempts, Theodore Roosevelt and the United States 
                                                 
1 Source:  Fleury 2007 
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were able to successfully build it, and it opened in 1914.  The French lost over 20,000 
men trying to build it, and the United States then lost an additional 5600, mostly to 
disease and landslides.  Land rights, construction, and fortification cost the United 
States only $387 million at the time – $8.0 billion in 2007 dollars, notably under 
budget and ahead of schedule.  So while technically the Panama Canal is a waterway 
and belongs in the previous section, it is singularly significant and interesting 
enough to warrant its own section.   
 
The canal is about 80 km long and takes nine hours to travel (not counting queue and 
lock times).  It was not possible to build it at sea level, therefore necessitating a pair 
of locks at both ends – the Pedro Miguel Locks on the Pacific side and the Gatun 
Locks on the Atlantic – and a massive dam.  The canal has a capacity of about 40 
ships per day, mostly all large commercial traffic.1 
 
The Panama Canal is a boon to Latin America, as well as the entire international 
shipping community.  But while it is true that it presents supply improvements when 
compared to the 19th century, many challenges related to the canal are increasingly 
coming to the forefront.  As previously stated, the canal is running at capacity.  This 
frequently results in daunting queues of as many as 100 ships at either entrance – a 
two-and-a-half day wait.2  The canal is not only being used to capacity, but that 
capacity is actually being threatened by the clearing of the Central American 
rainforests.  For environmental reasons that we need not go into, the reduction of the 
Central American rainforests is making it more challenging to maintain the water 
levels necessary to operate the canal and resulting in silt deposits along its bottom.3  
Of Latin American countries, Chile relies most heavily on the Panama Canal 
(excepting obviously Panama).  President Lagos of Chile noted in 2006 that half of all 
Chilean imports and exports utilize the canal.  In fact, Chile considers the canal so 
vital to their economy that they signed on with the United States and Panama in 2003 
                                                 
1 Source:  US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 1999 
2 Source:  Gumbel 2007 
3 Source:  Dean 2006 
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to use their military to help protect the canal from terrorism.1  But while the canal is 
essential to Latin America, its three largest users are the United States, China, and 
Japan, in that order.2  (Chile is the fourth.)  Due to the very nature of increased 
globalization and the double digit growth of China and many Latin American 
countries, it is obvious that the canal will only experience more and more demand, 
further establishing its position as a bottleneck of international trade. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-14.  World containership fleet by vessel type 
Source: US Maritime Administration 2005 
 
The canal’s costs are also of concern.  The fee for passage through the canal is not 
always a simple calculation.  For container ships the fee is simpler, but for other large 
commercial ships it is much more complicated.  Table ‎4-9 presents costs for container 
ships over the three year period starting in 2007.  Where goods being sold in markets 
such as the United States or Japan might better be able to absorb the shipping cost 
increases seen in the table, goods being made and sold in less developed economies 
(i.e. Latin American intraregional trade) will inevitably feel these fee increases much 
more and challenge the viability of many more products.  The costs listed above, 
however, refer to the fee charged by the Panama Canal Authority.  There are also 
                                                 
1 Source:  Cohen 2003 
2 Source:  Chilean government 2006 
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costs associated with the growing queue times that add an additional $50,000 of cost 
per ship.1 
 
 
Table ‎4-9.  Panama Canal fees for 2007-2009 
Source: Panama Canal Authority 2007 
 
 
Figure ‎4-15.  Annual global TEU’s carried by vessel type (in millions) 
Source: US Maritime Administration 2005 
 
Issues surrounding the Panama Canal continue when we look at the world’s 
merchant fleets.  The Panama Canal can accommodate ships up to a certain size.  The 
largest ships able to navigate the Panama Canal are called Panamax ships, able to 
carry about 4500 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units, or containers).  These ships are 
made to the specifications of the canal and require extra attention and time and 
special routing and conditions.  In recent times, however, shipbuilding technology 
has enabled, and ever increasing global trade has encouraged, the construction of 
ever larger ships.  They are now produced so large that they cannot fit in the Panama 
                                                 
1 Source:  Gumbel 2007 
Cost per 20ft 
container 
(US$)
Annual 
increase 
(%)
Cost for a full 
Panamax vessel 
(US$)
2007 54 243,000                      
2008 63 17% 283,500                      
2009 72 14% 324,000                      
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Canal’s locks and are too deep for parts of the canal.  These are called post-Panamax 
ships and can carry as much as 12,000 TEUs.  As of 2004, 17% of the world’s 
containership fleet were post-Panamax ships, representing 42% of available 
worldwide capacity.  This was up sharply from the respective 11% and 31% seen 
only three years before.  Panamax ships, on the other hand, saw declines over that 
period.  Nearly half of all ships on order at that time were post-Panamax ships.1 
 
In an attempt to address the capacity and post-Panamax issues, the Panama Canal 
Authority just started a $5.3 billion expansion project that received overwhelming 
public support in a national referendum.  It will add a third, larger set of locks, 
dredge more of the canal, and raise the water level, scheduled to complete by 2015. 
 
 
4.5 AIRPORTS 
 
The final mode to consider is air.  Generally, ocean freight is the cheapest means by 
which to ship goods, followed by rail and then truck.  Trucking is often less 
expensive in Latin America than in more-developed countries because of Latin 
America’s lack of regulations.  As we all know, air transport is the fastest and most 
expensive.  Considering the overall road, rail, and port conditions and capacities, the 
sheer size of Latin America, and the geological obstacles of the Amazon and Andes 
Mountains, air transportation can look increasingly attractive.  Air freight does not 
have the same appeal in Central America as it does in South America, however, 
particularly for regional trade, because of Central America’s far easier access to both 
oceans.  As an example, when shipping to Lima, Peru from Caracas, Venezuela (a 
straight-line distance of 2750 km), air transport is far more attractive than it would be 
from Guatemala City (a straight-line distance of 3320 km).  To move goods between 
Lima and Caracas by surface transport requires an arcing route around the Amazon, 
alongside and through the towering Andes Mountains, over very poor Peruvian 
roads, and across three international borders.  To achieve the same purpose by sea 
                                                 
1 Source:  United States Maritime Administration 2005 
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requires a long wait and costly fee for using the Panama Canal.  Air transport is 
much closer to point-to-point travel (depending on air routes) and avoids many of 
these problems in much less time, though at greater cost.  To move the same goods 
from Guatemala City to Lima, ocean transport is much more competitive because 
Guatemala can access the Pacific Ocean directly and has a more direct route to Lima.  
The scenario can be reversed as well, with Caracas as the final destination and 
comparing the routes from Lima and Guatemala City.  Guatemala City has relatively 
easy access to the Atlantic Ocean as well, again leading to the conclusion that air 
transportation is more competitive in South America.  It is interesting to compare the 
distances too.  We mentioned above how Caracas is approximately 600 kilometers 
closer to Lima as-the-crow-flies than is Guatemala City.  Considering the arcing route 
that a sea vessel would have to travel from Caracas, the effective distance to Lima 
increases by about 1500 kilometers, now making Guatemala City closer by 
approximately 900 kilometers.  Assuming that the ships travel at an average of 12 
knots, adding a two-day queue at the Panama Canal and, all other things being 
equal, getting to Lima will take a ship about 6.5 days from Guatemala City, but 10 
days and extra costs from Caracas.  Compare this to a third party logistics provider’s 
(3PL) lower-level air service quote of 3-5 days and one can see how Latin American 
geography, geology, and policy can have a significant impact on modal choice.  It is 
unlikely that many other regions have as nuanced a logistics environment as does 
Latin America. 
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Figure ‎4-16.  Map of extreme distances across Latin America 
Source: CIAT 2005; Geobytes 2006 
 
The most readily available data is from the CIA World Factbook which is much more 
informative on airports than it was for ports.  There we find the number of airports 
for each country broken down into airports with paved or unpaved runways, and 
further categorized by how long each airport’s longest runway is (greater than 10000 
feet, 8000 feet, 5000 feet, 3000 feet, or less than 3000 feet).  The length of a runway 
determines, in the simplest terms, the size of the aircraft that can use it.  More precise 
aircraft considerations are the lift/drag devices and the weight of the plane, payload, 
and fuel.  Other runway factors that determine what planes may potentially use it are 
slope, surfacing, nearby obstacles, and elevation.  This paper is concerned with 
freight transportation, which easily lends itself to larger planes because of the cost of 
using air and ability for surface transport to satisfy smaller regional needs.  Thus a 
focus on freight encourages us to focus on the availability of longer runways.  This is 
reinforced by the extreme elevations in Latin America.  Neufville and Odoni state in 
their book that ‚runway length should be increased *beyond ‚basic length‛+ by 7 
percent for each 300 meters of airport elevation.  Such approximations, however, are 
valid only as long as the total correction does not exceed about 35 percent of basic 
length.‛  Neufville and Odoni also provide some rough interpretations of the 
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usefulness of various runway lengths; a 7500 foot runway accommodates practically 
all 3000 kilometers flights in normal climate at sea level.  Referring back to the section 
in which we discussed elevation, we know that many highly populated Latin 
American cities are many hundreds of meters above sea level, meaning that they will 
need to have even longer runways.  Also considering the size of the region and 
population concentrations set almost exclusively along the coastlines, we can easily 
see that many flights will be far more than 3000 kilometers.  To relate this to Latin 
America, refer to the example we just described with Lima and also to Figure ‎4-16.  
For some additional context in terms of elevation, we look at the specification charts 
of the very large Boeing 747-400.  Maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) for the plane is 
almost 400,000 kilograms.  At a weight of only 350,000 kilograms, on a standard day 
at sea level with no wind or runway slope, this plane would need a runway no 
shorter than 8000 feet to take off.  At São Paulo (640 meter elevation), it will need 
almost 9000 feet of runway. 1   In Bogotá (2500 meter elevation), the same plane 
requires almost 13,000 feet of runway and a city as high as La Paz at 4000 meters is 
not even addressed on the specification chart.  Consider the addition of less than 
perfect weather or runway gradients (which can have opposite effects depending on 
the direction of the slope).  Bringing all of this together by using the CIA collection of 
Latin American airports, we narrow our consideration to the more logistics-friendly 
airports with at least one paved runway of 8000 feet or longer.  
 
 
In total airports (all surfaces, all lengths), Latin America is much more similar to the 
United States than we saw with roads, rail, or seaports.  However, comparing 
airports with paved 8000+ foot runways presents a more-than 2-to-1 ratio in favor of 
the United States.  Each country with some international comparators is displayed in 
Table ‎4-10, Table ‎4-11, and Table ‎4-12.  Each table is ordered by population per paved 
8,000+ foot airport, least to most, which gives an impression of how much 
infrastructure is available by relating how many people, on average, each airport 
must serve. 
                                                 
1 Source:  Boeing 2002 
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Table ‎4-10.  Unpaved airports in Latin America 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
 
 
Table ‎4-11.  Paved airports in Latin America 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
under 
3,000 ft
3,000-
5,000 ft
5,000-
8,000 ft
8,000-
10,000 ft
over 
10,000 ft
total 
unpaved
Russia 484 89 69 13 4 659
USA 7912 1732 153 7 0 9804
Peru 117 40 24 2 0 183
Bolivia 800 183 57 4 1 1045
Germany 181 34 3 1 0 219
Chile 216 49 12 2 0 279
Argentina 556 515 44 1 2 1118
Panama 50 11 1 0 0 62
Venezuela 149 97 15 1 0 262
Nicaragua 135 16 1 0 0 152
Ecuador 268 34 0 0 0 302
Costa Rica 96 19 0 0 0 115
Paraguay 532 267 26 0 0 825
Honduras 83 15 2 0 0 100
Mexico 1131 408 63 0 1 1603
Uruguay 29 19 3 0 0 51
Guatemala 301 82 6 1 0 390
Colombia 580 216 34 0 1 831
Brazil 1907 1555 83 0 0 3545
El Salvador 48 12 1 0 0 61
China 26 17 13 4 4 64
India 47 40 7 1 1 96
unpaved airports
under 
3,000 ft
3,000-
5,000 ft
5,000-
8,000 ft
8,000-
10,000 ft
over 
10,000 ft total paved
TOTAL 
airports
Russia 122 102 129 197 51 601 1260
USA 953 2323 1452 224 191 5143 14947
Peru 3 11 14 20 6 54 237
Bolivia 0 3 5 4 4 16 1061
Germany 135 72 58 52 14 331 550
Chile 19 25 22 8 5 79 358
Argentina 9 50 65 26 4 154 1272
Panama 29 18 5 1 1 54 116
Venezuela 18 61 34 10 5 128 390
Nicaragua 3 3 2 3 0 11 163
Ecuador 54 26 17 3 4 104 406
Costa Rica 11 21 2 2 0 36 151
Paraguay 5 0 5 0 3 13 838
Honduras 3 4 2 3 0 12 112
Mexico 29 77 84 29 12 231 1834
Uruguay 2 2 4 0 1 9 60
Guatemala 3 4 2 3 0 12 402
Colombia 12 42 39 8 2 103 934
Brazil 52 467 167 25 7 718 4263
El Salvador 0 2 1 0 1 4 65
China 67 20 130 128 58 403 467
India 21 84 75 52 18 250 346
paved airports
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Table ‎4-12.  Normalized airport statistics for Latin America 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2008 
 
Peru and Bolivia are seen to have disproportionate numbers of runways over 8000 
and 10000 feet, an apparent testament to their extreme elevations throughout the 
countries.  Chile, as usual, has some of the most infrastructure in place 
(proportionally speaking) in Latin America, followed by the generally well-
developed Argentina.  There is also no discernable difference between Central and 
South America, as indicated by the almost perfectly alternating green and orange 
down the tables.  The laggards of this metric are Colombia, which is somewhat 
surprising given some of the elevations in the country; Brazil, for whom air transport 
is highly attractive for international trade because of how the Amazon isolates its 
coastal region; and El Salvador, which is easily explained by its extreme density and 
the fact that we are counting airports and not runways.  (This can partially explain 
Brazil as well because it has some of the denser urban areas of Latin America.)  To 
demonstrate how important air transportation has become to Brazilian supply 
chains, 68% of foreign trade through major exporting companies is via air.1 
                                                 
1 Source:  Fleury 2007 
total paved 
over 8,000 ft Area (km 2 ) …
Population                  
(in thousands) …
GDP-PPP              
(in billions) …
GDP-PPP              
(per capita) …
Russia 248 68,852                570                            8.37                     59                        
USA 415 23,679                726                            33.40                  111                     
Peru 26 49,432                1,103                         8.37                     292                     
Bolivia 8 137,323              1,140                         4.97                     550                     
Germany 66 5,409                  1,248                         42.92                  521                     
Chile 13 58,227                1,253                         18.03                  1,108                  
Argentina 30 92,230                1,343                         17.46                  433                     
Panama 2 39,100                1,621                         14.57                  4,500                  
Venezuela 15 60,803                1,735                         22.33                  853                     
Nicaragua 3 43,165                1,892                         6.06                     1,067                  
Ecuador 7 40,509                1,965                         14.04                  1,014                  
Costa Rica 2 25,550                2,067                         27.98                  6,750                  
Paraguay 3 135,583              2,223                         8.85                     1,333                  
Honduras 3 37,363                2,495                         8.23                     1,100                  
Mexico 41 48,111                2,651                         33.00                  305                     
Uruguay 1 176,220              3,461                         37.05                  10,700                
Guatemala 3 36,297                4,243                         22.48                  1,800                  
Colombia 10 113,891              4,438                         32.04                  720                     
Brazil 32 265,999              5,938                         57.44                  303                     
El Salvador 1 21,040                6,948                         35.97                  5,200                  
China 186 51,597                7,107                         37.87                  28                        
India 70 46,966                16,141                       42.36                  39                        
… per paved airport over 8,000 ft
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Moving on to the quality of these airports, the GCI forces us to make a compromise.  
The survey question covering air is specifically targeting passenger transportation 
and incorporates frequency, which is not necessarily a direct substitute for airport 
quality as concerns logistics engineers.  It is presented below much like the other 
modes have been, though it should be considered with the above qualification in 
mind.  We will assume for now that relatively similar results would come from a 
more logistics-oriented survey, as they very well could.  As usual, Chile and Panama 
overperform the region and Paraguay languishes with some of the worst 
infrastructure in the world.  In general, Latin America’s airports seem to be one of its 
better infrastructure features with much of the third quartile pressing in on the upper 
half.  Panama and Mexico both make a play for top billing and inclusion in the first 
quartile and this is the only mode in which a majority of Latin American countries 
perform better than China. 
 
 
Table ‎4-13.  GCI airport quality rankings (mean 4.6) 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, et al. 2007 
 
 
  
Quartile Country Score Rank
Germany 6.7 3
USA 6.3 9
Chile 5.7 31
El Salvador 5.6 34
Panama 5.4 38
Mexico 4.8 60
Colombia 4.7 62
Costa Rica 4.6 66
Guatemala 4.5 67
Honduras 4.5 69
Ecuador 4.3 76
Russia 4.2 79
Nicaragua 4.1 80
China 4.1 86
Brazil 4.0 87
Venezuela 3.8 93
Peru 3.7 98
Uruguay 3.3 110
Argentina 3.2 113
Bolivia 3.1 118
Paraguay 2.6 129
Airports
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
We have now laid the foundation for a greater contextual understanding of Latin 
American transportation logistics.  This chapter applies a holistic analysis to the 
information in the previous chapters to explore potential network configurations that 
can best serve Latin America for various types of products.  We then briefly 
summarize this paper and discuss some related future research possibilities.  Since 
companies often underestimate the costs, requirements, and nuances of entering and 
operating in new international markets, this chapter can help to shed light on at least 
the transportation aspect of operating in Latin America. 
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5.1 RESULTING NETWORK IMPLICATIONS 
 
To address the network implications of what we’ve learned, we first briefly discuss 
differentiating products based on product value density (PVD).  Third-party logistics 
providers adjust pricing levels according to weight-to-volume ratios, but product 
viability and the way a supply must be built to support products is contingent on the 
PVD and it is imperative that businesses know and apply this characteristic.  Higher 
value density products (which can be measured as either value-to-weight or value-
to-volume) can more feasibly utilize more expensive, and thus generally faster, 
transportation.  Lower value density products therefore must use less expensive 
(slower) transportation in order to remain profitable product offerings.1 
 
Also necessary to consider is the attractiveness of infrastructure investment within 
each country.  In previous chapters we presented many of the considerations that 
would affect such attractiveness.  Aggregating such information into a regional 
ranking is the World Economic Forum’s IPIAI report.  It considers the following 
eight factors in its scoring and draws from various sources, surveys, and statistics to 
create this metric. 
 Macro environment 
 Legal framework 
 Political risk 
 Access to information 
 Financial market enablers 
 Track record 
 Government and society 
 Government readiness for private investment 
 
As with any dimensionless index, due to the arbitrary nature of its mathematical 
construction and chosen comparators, it should be considered a rough estimation 
and a first approximation for a general and basic regional understanding.  
                                                 
1 Source:  Lovell, Saw, and Stimson 2005 
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Unfortunately, it only covers about two-thirds of the Latin American countries and is 
especially light on Central America.  The results of the overall attractiveness score are 
presented in Error! Reference source not found.1.  We will consider the results of 
this index in our determination of network implications.  Concerning the unscored 
countries, we will assume that Panama and Costa Rica are relatively attractive 
because of Panama’s historical pro-trade positions and ties to the United States and 
Costa Rica’s popular FTZ.  We assume Nicaragua and Ecuador to be very 
unattractive because of their political alignment with clear IPIAI laggards Venezuela 
and Bolivia.  Paraguay and Honduras are assumed to be average. 
 
 
Figure ‎5-1.  Map of infrastructure investment attractiveness in Latin America 
Source: Mia, Estrada, and Geiger 2007 
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5.1.1 HIGH PVD – AIR 
High PVD products are those with high values and low mass or volume, such as 
micro processors and electronics.  These characteristics make air freight a feasible 
transportation option.  Furthering their association with air freight is the fact that 
they also tend to be more fragile products with shorter life-cycles and require fast 
supply chain responses due to difficult forecasting circumstances and a demanding 
customer demographic.  Air best meets these needs.  Air transportation also enjoys 
the advantage of bypassing physical barriers such as the Andes and the Amazon, and 
administrative barriers such as numerous international crossings, simplifying hub 
selection. 
 
To serve Latin America with high PVD products from a single warehouse/regional 
hub, the logical choices for most companies are: 
 Mexico 
 Colombia/Panama/Costa Rica 
 Chile 
 Miami, USA 
 
If product is manufactured in Asia and brought in by sea, then Mexico has the 
proximity and port system to facilitate this efficiently.  Product manufactured in the 
United States can easily be brought into a Mexican warehouse by any mode desired.  
European sources will also find Mexico easily accessible compared to Chile or 
Colombia.  On the downside, Mexico is far removed from South America – especially 
the main population centers of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. 
 
Another option is somewhere in Colombia, Panama, or Costa Rica.  These countries 
are also easily accessed from across the Atlantic.  Products coming from Asia by sea 
have fewer Colombian port options than would be expected, but Panama offers the 
best ports of the region.  Ocean freight from Asia is increasingly using Post-Panamax 
ships, so the Panama Canal is not yet a consistently available option.  Goods 
originating in the United States no longer have the surface transport options 
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available that they had in Mexico.  Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica, however, are 
much more centrally located than is Mexico. 
 
Chile is another potential Latin American hub.  It is farther from Asia, the United 
States, and Europe (which would require a trip through the Panama Canal), but 
much closer to the Brazilian, Argentinean, and of course Chilean markets.  
Considering that there will almost certainly be a separate hub in the United States 
that could serve Mexico, that Central America has a relatively small population and 
generally low purchasing power and thus require less focus, that Chile is the IPIAI’s 
most attractive country for investment by a wide margin, and that Chile’s airports 
are the best in Latin America, a strong argument can be made on Chile’s behalf. 
 
Finally we consider Miami.  Miami is obviously easily sourced by the United States 
and Europe.  The rail and road situation in the United States also makes Miami very 
accessible to Asia.  Miami has the same proximity issues with South America that 
Mexico has, but supply chain managers have the added benefit of a familiar 
regulatory and operational environment with Miami.  Miami will also have much 
better infrastructure to work with.  The proximity considerations are less impacting 
in this section since we are dealing with air.  Distance will certainly impact cost – 
especially as the cost of fuel continues to rise, but achievable travel times will be 
almost universally consistent across the region due to the nature of air.  Table ‎5-1 
summarizes this section. 
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Table ‎5-1.  Matrix of network implications for air freight strategies 
 
5.1.2 MEDIUM PVD – ROAD 
Products with a mid-level PVD in the United States are good candidates for trucking 
freight.  This offers both cost and time compromises between air (fast but expensive) 
and ocean/rail (inexpensive but slow).  But despite Latin America’s very low trucking 
costs, we found that its road quality, geographical and administrative barriers, and 
regulatory challenges make road transportation only regionally feasible.  To move 
goods from Venezuela or Colombia to Argentina likely requires an impractically 
circuitous route forced along the western coast of the continent by the Andes 
Mountains and then across the mountains likely from Chile.  Numerous international 
borders would be crossed, likely requiring numerous drivers, tractors, and 
cumbersome paperwork.  Peru’s exceptionally poor road connectivity and quality 
would add even more challenges to the route.  Central America, on the other hand, is 
cut off entirely from South America and connectivity throughout Central America 
itself is sparse.  Brazilian population centers (all along the eastern coast) are cut off 
almost entirely from the rest of the continent by the Amazon which, along with the 
Mexico
Colombia, 
Panama, or 
Costa Rica Chile Miami
Accessibility by potential 
product sources Asia, USA, 
& Europe
Very     
Accessible
Accessible 
(excepting 
Colombia's 
Pacific coast)
Somewhat 
Accessible
Accessible
Proximity and accessibility 
to major Latin American 
population centers
Far from south 
and east 
regions of 
South America
Centralized
Excellent if 
Mexico can be 
served by    
USA network
Far from south 
and east 
regions of 
South America
Airport infrastructure 
quality
High
High with 
Panama being 
Very High
Very High
World Class 
(USA 
generalization)
Private investment 
environment
Slightly 
Unattractive
Somewhat 
Attractive
Very     
Attractive
Most 
Attractive
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Andes Mountains, effectively cut South America in half down the center.  Only a few 
connections, and of questionable quality, exist through the rainforest; otherwise road 
connectivity is directed entirely into the southern cone.  These constraints on Latin 
American trucking make it practical only in a focused regional context.  The 
independent micro-regions that most companies would need to place hubs in for 
effective trucking coverage are as follows: 
 Mexico 
 Central America 
 Venezuela, Colombia, perhaps Ecuador 
 Peru 
 Bolivia, northern tip of Chile 
 Chile, perhaps Argentina 
 Argentina, Uruguay, southern Brazil 
 Southeastern Brazil 
 Northeastern Brazil 
 
Maintaining so many hubs for a mid-level PVD product serving Latin American 
markets probably doesn’t make much sense in most situations.  Of course, different 
products have different characteristics beyond PVD and some might allow for longer 
lead times to customers and retailers than others, thus enabling a company to invest 
in fewer hubs.  If a company cannot reduce the number of hubs needed by defining 
product characteristics or choosing to serve only particular markets, then the choice 
of road freight and even the product offering itself should be analyzed closely for 
viability in Latin America at all. 
 
5.1.3 LOW PVD – OCEAN & RAIL 
Raw materials such as steel, lumber, and coal are good examples of low PVD 
products.  Products like this cannot use air freight from an economic and sometimes 
physical perspective and usually do not use trucks unless they need to make small 
journeys from rail depots and seaports to specific destinations.  Therefore sea and rail 
freight are the ideal modes for these goods.  Because of the difficulties Latin America 
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has with road transportation, mid-level PVD products that can reasonably tolerate 
longer lead times should consider ocean-based freight as well. 
 
As discussed earlier, Mexico’s rail network is relatively extensive, Central America’s 
is non-existent, and South America’s is generally somewhere in the middle with the 
southern cone offering its best combination of coverage and quality.  The most 
logical places to place a hub are similar to what we considered for air freight and 
sometimes for similar reasons. 
 
Mexico provides an excellent centralized location for Asia, the United States, Europe, 
and South America.  In fact, the extreme congestion seen in the United States’s west 
coast ports has begun to divert large amounts of United States-bound goods from 
Asia through Mexican ports which then go north by truck and rail.1  This is leading 
Mexico to quickly and significantly upgrade its port capabilities and establish its 
status as a hemispheric hub.  Its short distances from coast-to-coast give it reasonable 
accessibility to all of South America while bypassing the expensive and congested 
Panama Canal.  Again, proximity to the southern and eastern regions of South 
America is a drawback, but the possibility of using the southern rail systems from 
Chilean ports is an ameliorating factor. 
 
Looking closer to the center of Latin America this time leads us to focus more on 
Panama than Costa Rica or Colombia.  The geographical advantages of these 
countries are obvious, but neither Costa Rica nor Colombia have rail or surface 
systems comparable to Panama’s even though Panama’s is but a single line.  Panama 
also has the better ports.  Due to the shape of South America by Panama, the 
proximity advantage of Panama over Mexico is real but usually not large (depending 
on what location in Mexico is chosen). 
 
Chile is again considered because of its presence in the southern cone, its 
infrastructure leadership, and the attractiveness of its business environment.  
                                                 
1 Source:  Macfarlan Capital Partners 2007 
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Argentina and even southern Brazil is accessible by rail, but the northeastern region 
of Brazil begins to stretch the limits of even the best Latin American rail systems.  
The shape of South America also turns northeastern Brazil into a significant voyage 
from Chile by sea considering that any products sourced from Asia, the United 
States, or Europe already had a long journey to Chile in the first place.  A potential 
strategy for reaching northeastern Brazil would be to transport by rail to Buenos 
Aires or Montevideo, and then by sea up along the Brazilian coast.  Chile also 
provides effective access to all Pacific countries and can reach Venezuela fairly well 
through the Panama Canal. 
 
Miami again offers a good staging point for some of the same reasons as we saw in 
the air freight section – a stable regulatory and operational environment, quality 
infrastructure, and reasonable though not the best accessibility.  Shipments from 
Miami have to use the canal to get to Ecuador, Peru, or Chile but can otherwise avoid 
the canal.   
 
In addition, Brazil might be considered as well simply because of how strong of a 
proportion of Latin America’s population it has.  Its distance from most other 
countries mitigates its attractiveness but not entirely because Uruguay, Argentina, 
and possibly Chile are again accessible by rail.  (Remember that gauge 
incompatibilities are sure to complicate rail transportation.)  Table ‎5-2 summarizes 
this section. 
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Table ‎5-2.  Matrix of network implications for ocean & rail freight strategies 
 
 
5.2 SUMMARY 
 
Despite Latin America’s proximity and cultural similarities compared with Asia, 
China and India still receive the lion’s share of attention from supply chain engineers 
exploring emerging market potential.  The economic and geographical size of the 
United States has also meant that many countries can and have operated purely 
domestically with still plenty of room for growth.  When a company decides to 
explore international operations, however, Latin America’s geographical location, 
manageable cultural distance, and growth potential are all promising for United 
States-based companies and should be included in any new market analyses. 
Mexico Panama Chile Miami Brazil
Accessibility by potential 
product sources Asia, USA, 
& Europe
Very     
Accessible
Accessible 
(excepting 
Colombia's 
Pacific coast)
Somewhat 
Accessible
Accessible
Slightly 
Unaccessible
Proximity and accessibility 
to major Latin American 
population centers
Very Good 
except to the 
southern cone
Excellent 
except to SE 
Brazil
Good             
except to 
Mexico, 
Venezuela, and 
NE Brazil
Good       
except to the 
southern cone
Mostly good 
for serving 
southern cone
Port infrastructure quality
Below        
Average
World Class Very High
World Class 
(USA 
generalization)
Poor
Rail infrastructure quality
Below        
Average
Average Average
World Class 
(USA 
generalization)
Poor
Rail infrastructure 
connectivity
Above        
Average
Just one route: 
between 
Atlantic and 
Pacific
Average         
(w/ gauge 
inconsistency)
World Class 
(USA 
generalization)
Average         
(w/ gauge 
inconsistency)
Private investment 
environment
Slightly 
Unattractive
Somewhat 
Attractive
Very     
Attractive
Most 
Attractive
Somewhat 
Attractive
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Latin America is not without transportation challenges, though.  Administrative 
distances are evident in the constant churning of regional trade blocs.  Differing 
customs procedures, corruption levels, transportation regulations, and security 
concerns can require new considerations in supply chain engineering compared to 
what is customary in the United States.  Monetary, currency, and political stability 
are also factors that should not be ignored. 
 
The geographical characteristics in Latin America present extremes not seen in the 
United States.  Massive mountain ranges, dense rainforests, destructive landslides, 
and pervasive riverways provide challenges and possibilities unique to Latin 
America. 
 
Infrastructure is central to any supply chain’s needs and Latin American countries 
have substantial ground to cover if they want to enter the upper echelon of economic 
development or even keep pace with other strongly emerging markets such as China.  
Increased privatization and public-private partnerships are making progress in this 
regard, but progress is too slow.  Surface transport is insufferable, especially in 
Central America, seaports are shallow and underdeveloped, and air freight is not 
always feasible due to product and market characteristics. 
 
Of course, not every country in the region is created equal.  The easiest countries to 
operate in considering all of the above factors are often Chile and Mexico.  Paraguay 
and Bolivia are consistently the most challenging – not coincidentally the two 
landlocked countries of the hemisphere.  Also not surprising is that the countries that 
have opened their markets the widest and worked the most to implement trade-
friendly policies have the healthiest economies. 
 
Supply chain engineers should ensure that they develop the proper knowledge and 
intuitive understanding for any market that they wish to enter before investing head-
long into new and different business and operational environments.  Understanding 
the differences between a new market and not only one’s current logistics expertise, 
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but also the new market’s surrounding region, is key to making good investment and 
operational decisions when developing new supply chain networks. 
 
Latin America may currently be in China’s and India’s shadows, but the US 
companies that have the wisdom to intelligently penetrate Latin American markets 
will find themselves in excellent positions over both the short and the long term. 
 
 
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
A natural next step stemming from this research would be a normalized metric 
measuring the logistical transportation ‚distance‛ between various Latin American 
and foreign cities. 
 
Within the United States and the EU, companies are accustomed to certain logistical 
frameworks.  Less sophisticated companies even manage to operate their supply 
chains by experience rather than analytics and models in many cases.  To try and 
bring developed Western business perspectives and practices to non-Western or 
developing countries has the potential for disaster.  Using China as an example, 
twice as many multinationals described their operations in China as ‚worse than 
planned‛ than described them as ‚better than planned‛ in a particular survey.1  The 
good news is that Latin America has the potential to be an easier business climate in 
many ways, though its challenges and differences must still not be overlooked. 
 
Much has been made of physical distances through applications of gravity models to 
such things as migration and trade.  Pankaj Ghemawat wrote in the Harvard 
Business Review a description of the distances that separate countries today as 
pertains to international business ambitions.  Despite increasing progress towards 
globalization and the reality of truly instantaneous communication anywhere in the 
world, he rebuts declarations of a new world without distances.  He argues that in 
                                                 
1 Source:  Ghemawat 2001 
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addition to the continued meaningful impact of geographical distances, there are 
other types of distance that continue to prevail as well.  These distances are 
categorized as cultural, administrative, geographical, and economic.  Many 
businesses overlook one or more of these types of distance between their currently 
comfortable country (or countries) of operation and the new markets to which they 
hope to expand.  Cultural distances are created by different languages, ethnicities, 
religions, and social norms.  Cultural distance often defines how effective a business 
is at managing local employees and the potential for its business model and product 
offerings in the first place.  Administrative distances result from political, monetary, 
regulatory, institutional, and historical differences.  The reduction of this distance is 
the primary goal of regional trade agreements and common markets.  Geographic 
distance is the most obvious of the group and includes remoteness or country size, 
lack of cross-border infrastructure or waterway access, and climates.  Finally, 
economic distances are captured by consumer incomes and the cost/quality of 
resources, infrastructure, and information. 
 
Ghemawat’s perspective on distances is meant to apply to the holistic business 
environment and operations.  Although the scope of this thesis is decidedly 
narrower, many if not most of the concepts remain relevant, though often delineated 
by more focused definitions.  The subjects covered in the ensuing chapters can be 
easily associated with Ghemawat’s distance schema and are all direct influencers of 
logistics transportation.  The only type of distance that does not apply directly to 
freight is that of cultural distance and has thus been ignored in the bulk of this work 
(though it can apply to operations). 
 
Latin America’s characteristics have here been described and compared primarily 
between Latin American countries and generalized against international examples.  
For United States companies, it is important to understand how the region’s logistical 
landscape compares more specifically to that of the United States and what 
differences can be expected and hopefully mitigated.  It is possible that the 
differences create an environment in which a business cannot successfully compete.  
It is important to be open to this possibility when evaluating new and emerging 
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markets and thus avoid believing that these markets are necessary at all costs 
because of the recent attention they’ve garnered.  In this vein, any United States-
based supply chain manager expecting similar levels of efficiency and 
transportability in Latin America will likely find himself ill-equipped to compete in 
the region.  Those that are prepared to assume higher costs and accept less reliable 
transit times in order to serve markets with less buying power could still be 
surprised by the necessity of doing many things much differently.  The United States 
relies on a very competitive and well-built ground transport network, so this surprise 
could manifest itself as a need to reorganize the supply chain around ocean and air 
freight due to Latin America’s lack of maintained and connected surface 
infrastructure.  Some simply do not comprehend the purely physical distances 
throughout the region as compared to the United States.  Still others could be 
frustrated by the array of regulatory differences between the United States and Latin 
American countries despite alleged trading blocs. 
 
Constructing a metric to convey the relative logistical transportation distances 
throughout Latin American cities was outside the scope of this thesis and will require 
comprehensive data collection. 
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